THE LAWYER AS INFORMER
GERARD

E. LYNCH*

From the schoolyard "tattletale" to the police officer's "confidential
informant" to the Pentagon "whistle blower," our society is deeply ambivalent toward those who report the wrongdoing of others to the authorities. On the one hand, society values informers. Without informers,
serious misbehavior would certainly escape correction. The police officers' code of silence with respect to fellow officers' crimes, for example,
may be a major obstacle to eliminating police corruption and brutality.
On the other hand, society scorns informers as betrayers of confidence.
Even one who violates an antisocial pact such as the police officers' code
of silence is viewed as having breached a trust.1 Such breaches leave all
of us less secure in our reliance on the confidence of others.
Lawyers, one would think, would be among the last to make a virtue
of informing. At the center of their professional code of conduct is a
special obligation of confidentiality that is honored even at the cost of
serious suffering and injustice. 2 Although this strong obligation applies
only within the limited area of client "confidences" and "secrets," '3 the
heroes of the legal profession tend to be those who keep secrets faithfully
rather than those who blow the whistle on wrongdoers. 4 The ethos of the
legal profession is not one that emphasizes the importance of uncovering
the truth at the expense of other social values. Nevertheless, the codes of
professional conduct have uniformly required lawyers to report the misconduct of fellow lawyers to the appropriate disciplinary bodies. 5
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, Columbia University. Special thanks are due to Richard Uviller for his encouragement and his comments in connection with this piece.
1. See generally R. DALEY, PRINCE OF THE CITY (1978).
2. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1981).
3. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1981).

4. A recent treatise on professional responsibility maintains that "[i]t is probably no exaggeration to say that the public defines lawyers as 'those who keep secrets' as much as it considers them to
be 'those who litigate cases' or 'those who draft documents.'" G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW
OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 89 (1985).

Lay observers often see this devotion to secrecy as characteristic of the profession's villains as well as
of its heroes. Witness the sinister lawyer Tulkinghorn in Bleak House, who "is surrounded by a
mysterious halo of family confidences, of which he is known to be the silent repository. There are
noble mausoleums rooted for centuries in retired glades.., which perhaps hold fewer noble secrets
than walk abroad among men, shut up in the breast of Mr. Tulkinghorn." C. DICKENS, BLEAK
HOUSE 13-14 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1977).
5. See infra notes 12-104 and accompanying text.
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This obligation is extraordinary. Generally speaking, citizens are
not placed under a duty to report crimes that have come to their attention. 6 It might be argued that this dispensation is part of a rough com-

promise by which society resolves its ambivalence toward informers:
although citizens must, however reluctantly, come forward and give

truthful information when summoned by the courts, they generally are
not under any duty to volunteer information. Clear exceptions to this
generalization are rare, 7 but we are sufficiently uncomfortable with its
implications that we sometimes pretend otherwise.
The purpose of this article is to explore the obligation placed upon

lawyers to act as informers against other lawyers. 8 First, the article will
discuss the substance of the ethical reporting requirements and the extent

to which the general ambivalence toward informing has blurred the contours of those obligations. 9 Second, it will compare the obligation imposed upon lawyers with the obligations imposed upon other citizens in

analogous situations.10 Finally, it will offer some conclusions about the
appropriateness of the present ethical reporting requirements.1I The the-

sis of this article is that society's general ambivalence toward informing is
rooted in moral values that deserve more respect than the codes of pro-

fessional conduct have accorded them. The article will conclude by suggesting ways in which the rules governing lawyers' conduct can be

brought into conformity with those values.
I.

INFORMING UNDER THE NORMS OF LEGAL ETHICS:

Two

HYPOTHETICALS

Let us imagine two situations. The first involves two law students,
Cool and Straight. Though he is a capable and conscientious student,
Cool lives in the fast lane after hours. An equally successful student,
6. See infra notes 106-23 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
8. Academic attention to this ethical obligation has been negligible. A few articles addressing
this topic have appeared in academic journals. See Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to
Report Other Lawyers' Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 95;
Note, The "Stool Pigeon" Canons: A Comment on CertainSections of Canons 28 and 29 ofthe ABA
Code of Ethics, 41 CONN. B.J. 339 (1967). Discussions in bar journals, often written by counsel for
disciplinary bodies, are usually limited to reminding lawyers of the existence of code provisions
requiring reporting and deploring widespread noncompliance. See, e.g., Gentile, Reporting Misconduct by OtherLawyers, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 23, 1984, at 1, col. 1. Although most professional responsibility casebooks contain problems or materials calling attention to the obligation, see, e.g., T. MORGAN
& R. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 139-42 (1976),
only one includes any material encouraging critical discussion of the rules in this area. See A.
KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

9. See infra notes 12-104 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 106-64 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 165-95 and accompanying text.

307-12 (1976).
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Straight disapproves of Cool's life-style, but is content to live and let live.
At a graduation party thrown by a mutual friend, Straight observed Cool
openly using cocaine and supplying the drug to others. Now, Cool and
Straight are applying for admission to the bar. Straight meets Cool just
prior to his interview with the Character and Fitness Committee. When
asked by Straight if he is at all nervous about the impending interview,
Cool replies, "Nah. They've got nothing on me. And you know how
respectable I can be when I want to."
Meanwhile, inside the interview room, two members of the committee, Pinstripe and Mouthpiece, are talking about taxes. Pinstripe is
bemoaning her huge tax bill. Mouthpiece remarks: "You just practice
the wrong kind of law. Corporate clients pay by check. My guys pay in
paper bags full of cash. That way, you can make the tax rate whatever
you want." Pinstripe is shocked by this statement. Mouthpiece continues: "Let me teach you a little bit about the difference between tax
avoidance and tax evasion. If you're reasonable about it and not too
greedy, you can bend the rules a little bit. That's avoidance. If you steal
like a bandit and get caught at it, that's evasion."
In each of these situations, an individual has gained knowledge of
information suggesting that another has committed a criminal offense.
Both Straight and Pinstripe are free to report the misconduct that has
come to their attention. But they violate no law if they do not. Nor, I
submit, do they violate any generally held norm of right behavior if they
keep the information to themselves. On the contrary, it is likely that
most people in their respective social circles would think less of them if
they did inform.' 2 The openness of drug use in the university setting
demonstrates a tacit expectation that students who do not themselves
indulge in drugs will tolerate usage by others. And open discussion of
petty tax cheating is sufficiently commonplace in business and professional spheres to demonstrate a similar expectation of tolerance. Violators of these "codes of silence" are probably subject to the type of
ostracism experienced by police officers who report the misconduct of
their colleagues.
But Pinstripe is a lawyer, and Straight wants to be a lawyer. Does
membership in the bar carry with it a duty to inform that is not applicable to the nonlawyers in their respective social circles?
12. Even an enthusiast of the rule requiring informing by lawyers agrees that the act of informing in these circumstances "seems contrary to the nature of most of us." Thode, supra note 8, at
100. Another enthusiast concedes that the rule "is viewed as cowardly, underhanded, dishonorable
and disloyal ... a bad thing, even when more harm is suffered if the misdeeds are not revealed."
Gentile, supra note 8, at 2, col. 1. These authors regard such "natural" reactions as mere sentiments
to be curtly dismissed by serious moralists.
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Informing and Bar Applicants.

1. The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Under the American
Bar Association's
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the
"Code"),' 3 Straight apparently is under no duty to inform because he is
not yet a lawyer. The Code is clearly intended to govern only the behavior of lawyers.14 Nonetheless, the Code does impose at least one obligation upon the prospective lawyer. DR 1-101 indirectly requires a bar
applicant to be truthful in his application for admission. The way in
which this obligation is imposed, however, is oddly ex post facto.' 5 Because the Code's sanctions apply only to lawyers, Cool could not be disciplined if he were to be denied admission for falsely claiming that he had
never used drugs.' 6 Cool could be disciplined only if he were first to
7
secure admission to the bar.'
The rule under which Cool would be disciplined-DR 1-101-requires disclosure of material facts only in connection with one's own bar
application. Therefore, it would not apply to Straight, who has damaging information about another applicant. This is not to say, however,
13. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility continues to provide the governing standards for bar discipline in most jurisdictions. At this writing, seven states have adopted the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Arizona, Delaware, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New
Jersey, and Washington. California has its own code of professional conduct. In all other states,
lawyers' conduct is governed by some version of the Code.
14. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1981) ("Obviously, the Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules cannot apply to non-lawyers.").
Although the preliminary statement goes on to point out that the same standards are indirectly
imposed on the employees and associates of lawyers, no mention is made of the obligations of bar
applicants.
15. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-101(A) (1981) ("A lawyer is
subject to discipline if he has made a materially false statement in, or if he has deliberately failed to
disclose a material fact requested in connection with, his application for admission to the bar.").
16. It is generally agreed that making a false, misleading, or evasive statement in connection
with a bar application is a valid ground for denying admission. See, e.g., In re Walker, 112 Ariz.
134, 138-40, 539 P.2d 891, 895-97 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 956 (1976); In re Beasley, 243 Ga.
134, 137, 252 S.E.2d 615, 617-18 (1979).
Of course, wholly apart from professional discipline, such a false statement might give rise to
criminal liability under statutes penalizing false statements to government bodies. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1621, 1623 (1982); MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 241.1-.3 (1962).
17. Disciplinary Rule I-101(A) applies only to "lawyers," but the language of the rule is not
qualified in a manner that would limit its scope to applications for bar admission made by attorneys
already admitted to practice in another jurisdiction. For example, the rule does not state "a lawyer
is subject to discipline if he has made a materially false statement in, or if he has deliberately failed to
disclose a material fact requested in connection with, his application for admission to the bar of
another jurisdiction." A lawyer already admitted in one jurisdiction who makes a false statement in
the course of an application for admission in another jurisdiction may presumably be disciplined in
the second jurisdiction under DR 1-101(A) after he has been admitted. That same lawyer may also
be disciplined in the first jurisdiction under DR 1-102(A)(4), which prohibits "conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 1-102(A)(4) (1981).
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that Straight is entirely free to follow the usual social practice of avoiding
involvement. State bar admission standards that require "good character" or "fitness to practice law" are notoriously vague. 18 A state court or
admitting authority might well conclude that the nonlawyer applicant
should be denied admission to the bar if he has exhibited conduct that
would subject a lawyer to professional discipline.' 9 Thus, the nature of
Straight's ethical obligations had he been a member of the bar at the time
Cool applied for admission becomes relevant. Are lawyers required to
report derogatory information concerning bar applicants to admission

authorities?
The aspirational norms of the Code2 ° certainly suggest the existence
of such a duty. EC 1-3 states that a lawyer "should report to proper

officials all unfavorable information he possesses relating to the character
or other qualifications of an applicant."' z Taken literally, this sweeping

command completely reverses the social norm that guides the conduct of
other professionals. There can be little doubt that Cool's drug use consti18. See, eg., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 262-64 (1957) (noting vagueness of "good
moral character" requirement); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (determination of moral character "involves an exercise of delicate
judgment"); see also Rhode, Moral Characteras a ProfessionalCredential,94 YALE L.J. 491, 512-46
(1985) (discussing standards of moral character); Committee Report: The Characterand Fitness
Committees in New York State, 33 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 20, 37 (1978) (noting the "total absence of
stated standards for determining when an applicant is unfit to be licensed for the practice of law")
[hereinafter Committee Report].
19. Insofar as membership in the bar carries with it special responsibilities, one could argue
that instances of behavior that would constitute clear misconduct in the case of a lawyer would not
necessarily indicate a lack of good moral character in the case of a nonlawyer.
One could even argue that a lay person's failure to abide by the Code's exacting standards of
truthfulness, see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1981), would
not necessarily indicate an inability or unwillingness on the part of that person to comply with those
standards once he has been admitted to the bar. Of course, one could also argue that admission
standards should be stricterthan disciplinary standards, because the applicant has less at stake than
one who has already invested many years in the profession, and because prevention of misconduct is
preferable to discipline. Professor Rhode has argued that admission and disciplinary authorities
have tended to apply far stricter standards to bar applicants than to attorneys in disciplinary proceedings, and that this double standard is indefensible. Rhode, supra note 18, at 546-55.
But however this problem should be resolved, admitting authorities are probably strongly
tempted to give content to vague good character requirements by asking whether particular conduct
of the applicant is consistent with the Code. It is frequently asserted that the general standard of
good character is the same for purposes of admission as for purposes of discipline. See, e.g., Hallinan
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 452-53, 421 P.2d 76, 81-82, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 23334 (1966).
20. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1981)
("The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which
every member of the profession should strive.").
21. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-3 (1981).
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tutes "unfavorable information" 22 relating to his qualifications to practice law in at least three ways. First, it constitutes a violation of a
criminal law that carries substantial penalties. 23 Under EC 1-5, lawyers

should "refrain from all illegal... conduct" because "even minor violations of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal

profession."' 24 Second, drug usage amounting to abuse or addiction may
be a sign of mental or emotional instability, a ground for disqualification
from practice. 25 Third, because Straight has reason to believe that Cool

has deceived or will deceive the character committee by concealing his
history of drug use, Straight's information may be used to establish a
26
separate violation of the rules of professional conduct by Cool.

There is reason to doubt, however, that the bar genuinely aspires to
the norm suggested in EC 1-3. The very sentence that contains the ad-

monition to report all "unfavorable" information opens with a warning
that the lawyer "should not become a self-appointed investigator or judge

of applicants for admission."'27 This curious warning seems to reflect an
unconscious ambivalence toward informing rather than a carefully reasoned limitation on the duty to report. There is, admittedly, some identifiable substance to a rule providing that a lawyer should not become an

investigator of bar applicants; a meaningful distinction can be made between reporting unfavorable information already known and searching
28
out undetected wrongs.

22. The phrase "unfavorable information" plainly encompasses material that would not in itself
disqualify an applicant, but would reflect negatively on the applicant's qualifications.
23. See, eg., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18 (McKinney
1980).
24. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1981). Whether any such violation of the law automatically constitutes a disciplinary violation is discussed at length in the text
accompanying notes 76-85 infra. It should be noted, in connection with that discussion, that possession and distribution of illegal drugs have universally been found to constitute crimes of moral turpitude. See, eg., In re Preston, 616 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Alaska 1980) (distribution of cocaine); In re Moore,
453 N.E.2d 971, 974-75 (Ind. 1983) (possession of marijuana); In re Rabideau, 102 Wis. 2d 16, 2930, 306 N.W.2d 1, 7-8 (1981) (possession of marijuana), appeal dismissed,454 U.S. 1025 (1981). On
the other hand, the infrequency of cases involving marijuana suggests that although courts will affirm disciplinary sanctions in such cases, little active enforcement is occurring. See Rhode, supra
note 18, at 552.
25. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-6 (1981).
26. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY DR 1-101(A) (1981) (prohibiting
false statement in admission application); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
27. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-3 (1981).
28. One does wonder, however, why it was thought necessary explicitly to condemn investigation. The affirmative reporting requirement, which refers to "information [the lawyer] possesses,"
already plainly makes this point. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-3
(1981). Few lawyers have the time or inclination to undertake uncompensated private investigation
in any event. Notably, EC 1-3 goes beyond merely stating that a lawyer is not required to seek out
unfavorable information about applicants; it specifically counsels against doing so.
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But the rest of the warning contained in EC 1-3 is practically indecipherable. What can it mean to say that the lawyer should not be a
"judge" of the applicant for admission? Of course the lawyer is not the
ultimate judge of the applicant's qualifications; that role is left to the
admitting authority. Yet the ethical admonition requires the lawyer to
judge whether he has "unfavorable" information concerning the applicant. 29 The related Disciplinary Rule requires the lawyer to make an
even more absolute judgment with regard to the qualifications of the applicant.30 What are we to make of the statement that the lawyer not be a
"self-appointed" investigator or judge? Any appointment to either role
necessarily comes from the Code itself-a code drafted by lawyers for
their own self-regulation. Under the Code, then, each lawyer is in a sense
a self-appointed guardian of the profession's ethical virtue. Thus, the
admonition not to be a "self-appointed investigator or judge" cannot provide an intelligible norm for those seeking to fulfill their professional obligations. Rather, the Ethical Consideration demonstrates our emotional
ambivalence about informing by grafting language associated with attacks on informers onto an admonition to inform.
A moment's thought suggests that there is good reason for the ambivalence evident in EC 1-3. Would a rule requiring lawyers to report all
unfavorable material concerning the qualifications of bar applicants really be desirable? Some restriction undoubtedly should be placed on the
kind of material required to be reported. Consider, for example, the situation facing those members of the bar who happen to be law professors.
Most law professors probably do not have information about their students that would raise serious doubts about the students' qualifications to
practice law. But the "unfavorable" standard is broader. Presumably,
an applicant's consistent failure as a student to be prepared for class,
although not in itself a reason to deny admission, is "unfavorable information" relating to the applicant's qualifications. It is probable that if
some more significant dereliction came to the attention of the admitting
authorities, and the question arose whether that dereliction constituted
an isolated episode or indicated a general character flaw, the admitting
authorities would at least consider the professor's information relevant.
Yet to burden character committees with accounts of law school
derelictions would certainly be undesirable. Such information would
usually have little or no bearing on the applicant's qualifications to be29. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-3 (1981).
30. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-101(B) (1981) ("A lawyer shall

not further the application for admission to the bar of another person known by him to be unqualified
....

" (emphasis added)). The words "known by him to be unqualified" impose a standard that is

difficult to satisfy. See infra notes 32-34, 60-68 and accompanying text.
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come a member of the bar. The point is not merely that the ethical consideration admonishing complete disclosure should make an exception
for information that is de minimis. An unrestricted obligation to report
is undesirable for other reasons. Even where the law professor can recount a series of incidents showing irresponsibility, selfish lack of concern for others, dismal judgment, and marginal academic achievement, it
is doubtful that admitting authorities really want such information. Too
much information about the character flaws of bar applicants would
leave the admitting authorities with the difficult choice of either admitting very few attorneys or acknowledging that some character failings do
not detract from one's ability to practice law.
Moreover, an unrestricted obligation to report would be disruptive
of important relationships. After all, society's general unwillingness to
impose a legal or moral obligation to report rests largely on the realization that confidential social relationships would be impossible to maintain were every member of society obligated to report the failings of his
colleagues. 31 Although few social relationships are regarded as sufficiently important to warrant the protection of an evidentiary privilege,
many are at least important enough to warrant exemption from a
mandatory reporting requirement. If such an exemption is justified with
respect to society in general, then a restricted obligation to report is justified with respect to lawyers, even in the special context of admission to
the bar.
Perhaps because of considerations such as these, as well as the practical difficulty of enforcement, the Code's drafters were unable to endorse
a reporting requirement-even as an aspiration-without including a
rhetorical swipe at those who would too eagerly enforce it. This ambivalence is reflected even more strongly in the Disciplinary Rule that serves
as the enforceable alter ego of EC 1-3.32 Even though lawyers should
"aspire" to the goal of reporting all "unfavorable information" about bar
applicants, the Disciplinary Rule does not require authorities to impose
sanctions for failure to do so. Instead, DR 1-101(B) requires only that a
lawyer not "further the application of" one "known by him to be un33
qualified" with respect to character, education, or other qualification.
31. See infra notes 139-57 and accompanying text.
32. The Code's professed intention is that the Ethical Considerations be merely hortatory and
the Disciplinary Rules be mandatory minimum standards. Some courts, however, have held that
sanctions may be imposed for conduct that falls short of violating a Disciplinary Rule. See e.g.,
Stratmore v. State Bar, 14 Cal. 3d 887, 889-90, 538 P.2d 229, 230, 123 Cal. Rptr. 101, 102 (1975).
33. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIaILITY DR 1-101(B) (1981). In contrast, the
code proposed by the American Trial Lawyers Foundation requires that a lawyer "who has material,
adverse information about a candidate for the bar, shall convey that knowledge to the appropriate
... admission authorities." THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT Rule 8.2 (The Roscoe

Vol. 1986:491]

THE LAWYER AS INFORMER

The difference between DR 1-101(B) and EC 1-3 is significant. If
lawyers take as a guide the language of DR 1-101(B) rather than that of
EC 1-3, very little information about bar applicants need be disclosed to
admitting authorities. DR 1-101(B) requires action only if the bar applicant is "known by [the lawyer] to be unqualified" for admission. If any
weight at all is put on the word "known," the reporting obligation will
rarely arise. The character requirements for admission to the bar are
notoriously vague; it is often difficult for lawyers or prospective lawyers
to learn precisely what kind of information would be relevant. 34 Moreover, a character committee probably bases its ultimate judgment regarding qualifications on an overall assessment of character rather than on a
single incident. A lawyer is therefore almost always in a strong position
to argue that he does not "know" that an applicant is unqualified with
respect to character.
But even where the lawyer is sufficiently familiar with both the applicant's relevant activities and the admitting authority's standards to
"know" that the applicant is not qualified, DR 1-101(B) requires only
that the lawyer not "further [that individual's] application for admission
to the bar." It would be unreasonable to regard a passive failure to report misconduct as conduct furthering an individual's application for admission. 35 But then, what does DR 1-101(B) mean? Presumably a
lawyer who knows that an applicant is morally unfit yet nevertheless files
an affidavit of good character on behalf of that applicant has violated DR
1-101(B). If DR 1-101(B) applies only in such situations, it is not inconsistent with society's general ambivalence toward informing. Society
may be reluctant to impose an affirmative obligation to inform, but it
does not hestitate to condemn outright deceit. In cases of perjury, for
example, the perjurer's reluctance to inform is not as a general rule considered in mitigation of guilt. 36 Yet an obligation to avoid outright deceit
with regard to an applicant's qualifications hardly needs to be expressed
in a separate rule; filing a false affidavit of good character is professional
Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation, Discussion Draft 1981) [hereinafter ATLF CODE].
Delaware has amended its version of the Code to similar effect. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE, Canon 1 at
3 (1977) [hereinafter CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE]. Because this rule would
bring the disciplinary rule into conformity with EC 1-3, it would have all of the latter's
disadvantages.
34. See Committee Report, supra note 18, at 36-39.
35. The word "furtherance" simply does not have that meaning. And courts do not so interpret it in analogous legal contexts. For example, one who knows of the existence of a conspiracy and
fails to report it is not deemed to have acted in furtherance of the conspiracy so as to be liable as a

coconspirator or accessory.
36. Cf United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 180 (1977) ('[P]erjury is not a permissible way of

objecting to the Government's questions.").
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misconduct in any event. 37
It is not clear what kind of conduct short of vouching for the appli-

cant's moral character in an official recommendation would constitute
furthering his application.3" It might be argued that a law school admis-

sions director furthers the application of a morally unfit lawyer by offering law school admission to a morally unfit student. It might also be
argued that a law school professor furthers the application of a morally

unfit lawyer by giving a passing grade to a morally unfit student. But
neither of these actions apparently would qualify as furthering an "appli-

cation for admission to the bar" because in neither case has an application actually been filed.

Even if an application had been filed, it is not clear that DR 1101(B) would apply to such indirect means of furthering an application.
For example, it might be argued that if a lawyer knows that a law school

graduate is unfit yet hires him as a clerk or paralegal pending his application for admission, that lawyer is "furthering" the graduate's application
by helping him build a record of useful employment. But surely, DR 1101(B) cannot be meant to apply to such indirect actions. "Furthering"

cannot mean doing anything whatsoever that might ultimately make it
easier for an applicant to become admitted to the bar. Otherwise, a lawyer could not ethically pay for his child's bar-review course if that child

were unqualified for admission to the bar. It is reasonable to conclude,
then, that "furthering" an application occurs only when the action in
39
question is specifically intended to advance the application itself.
Thus, Straight seems to be in the clear. As a bar applicant, he is not
obligated under the Code to volunteer information about another appli37. The Code provides that "[a] lawyer shall not... [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1102(A)(4) (1981). Cf id. DR 7-102(A)(5) ("In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not...
[k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact.").
38. Some conduct that might be regarded as furthering an application would surely be privi.
leged. A lawyer is presumably entitled to further the bar applicant's cause by representing him in
connection with his application, regardless of the lawyer's knowledge concerning the applicant's
moral fitness. The first amendment would presumably protect advocacy of the admission of candidates unqualified under current standards on the ground that bar admission standards constitute an
issue of public significance. Cf Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 598-604 (1967) (distinguishing between advocacy of an abstract position and incitement of unlawful activities).
39. Arguably, if admitting authorities required employers to certify the fact of employment,
providing the requisite certificate could be seen as furthering the application. This would probably
have little practical effect because character committees requiring such certification would presumably also require the employer to express some sort of opinion regarding the applicant's qualifications.
Unless such forms were carelessly worded, the employer's obligation to answer truthfully would
once again require reporting the damaging information. This sort of procedure, however, takes us
out of the realm of"informing" and into the area of truthful response to lawful requests for information-an area that does not involve the same moral implications as unsolicited informing.

Vol. 1986:4911

THE LAWYER AS INFORMER

cant. Even if he were already an admitted lawyer, he could not be disciplined for failing to report Cool's drug use, although EC 1-3 encourages
him to do so. Assuming the admitting authority holds applicants to the
profession's enforceable disciplinary norms rather than to its aspirational
goals, Straight is apparently free to follow his conscience in the matter.
2. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The American Bar
Association's newly promulgated Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(the "Model Rules") considerably modify the standards applicable to
Straight's dilemma. Unlike the Code, the Model Rules do not attempt to
express both aspirational goals and enforceable obligations. Nonetheless,
there is still a distinction between what the Model Rules urge and what
they require. As the introductory commentary acknowledges:
Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall
not." These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and
define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion .... Other Rules define the nature of relationships between
the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a
lawyer's professional role. Many of the Comments use the term
"should." Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide
guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules.40
Like the Code, the Model Rules are thus structured in a way that permits
them to reflect society's ambivalence toward informing by separating
"rules" from "aspirations."
The first question with regard to Straight's dilemma is again: What,
if anything, do the Model Rules require bar applicants to disclose about
their own conduct? Like the Code, the Model Rules are intended to regulate the conduct of lawyers. The Model Rules appear to make no distinction between the candor required of lawyers in the bar admissions
process and that required of applicants themselves. Rule 8.1 applies to
the "applicant for admission to the bar" as well as the "lawyer in connection with a bar admission application. ' 41 The Model Rules thus avoid
the awkward retroactive application of conduct requirements found in
40. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).

41. Id. Rule 8.1. Rule 8.1 provides in full:
An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission
application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person
to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admission or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require
disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule 1.6.
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the Code. 42 Rule 8.1 straightforwardly prohibits bar applicants from en43
gaging in certain kinds of dishonest conduct.

In addition, Rule 8.1 strengthens the requirement of candor for bar
applicants, at least with respect to their own applications. Although

Rule 8.1(a) merely carries forward DR 1-101(A)'s rule against making
false statements on an application, the Model Rules impose a stricter

obligation upon the bar applicant to reveal unfavorable information
about himself. Under the Code, the bar applicant is inviting later discipline if he "deliberately fail[s] to disclose a material fact requested in

connection with" his application. 44 Thus the enforceable obligation to
disclose information about oneself applies only with respect to information actually requested by the bar examiners.4 5 Under Rule 8.1(b), in
contrast, a bar applicant is required to disclose any fact "necessary to
correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the

matter."' 46 Rule 8.1(b) still stops considerably short of requiring the applicant to fully disclose all facts that he believes are material to his appli-

cation for admission. Unlike the Code, however, the Model Rules do not
limit the self-reporting requirement to requested information. 47 Rule
8.1(b) appears to require the applicant to correct any misapprehension he

knows has arisen, whether or not he is personally responsible for the
misapprehension and whether or not the misapprehension concerns a
48
matter material to the admitting authority's inquiry.
The Model Rules, then, may require Cool to correct any misappre-

hension the bar examiners may have regarding his character. But what
42. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
43. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (1983). Although this formulation is less awkward, it does not solve the problem of sanctions. Presumably, candidates whose
falsehoods are discovered before admission may be denied admission and only those who are successful in attaining admission are subject to professional discipline.
44. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-101(A) (1981) (emphasis added).
45. Although it may be putting too much strain on a mere "aspiration" to subject it to such
close statutory analysis, it might be argued that EC 1-3 encourages the lawyer who is himself a bar
applicant to report any unfavorable information about himself, just as he would about any other
applicant. EC 1-3 refers to "applicants" and not, for example, to "others applying for admission to
the bar."
46. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1(b) (1983).
47. Rule 8.1 does carry forward the Code's requirement that an applicant disclose material
requested information. Although Rule 8.1(b) requires only that the applicant not "fail to respond to
a lawful demand for information from an admission ... authority," Rule 8.1(a) requires that the
response not be "false." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1(a), (b) (1983). A
response that omitted a material requested fact would presumably be within that prohibition.
48. It is noteworthy that a lawyer or applicant apparently must correct any misapprehension
and respond to any lawful demand for information in connection with disciplinary or admission
matters, regardless of whether it is material. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
8.1(b) (1983). Thus, any reporting obligation Straight may have under this provision does not depend on whether Cool's dereliction renders him unqualified for admission.
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about Straight? Is he obligated to correct the examiners' misapprehensions regarding Cool's character?
Once again, it is helpful to begin by assuming that Straight is already a member of the bar. Rule 8.1(a) requires a "lawyer in connection
with a bar admission application" as well as an "applicant for admission"
to correct any misapprehensions on the part of the admitting authorities. 4 9 The phrase "a lawyer in connection with a bar application" might
be interpreted to refer only to lawyers who are themselves applying for
admission to the bar of another jurisdiction. The language of Rule 8.1(a)
as a whole, however, does not support this interpretation. 50 The commentary following Rule 8.1(a) clearly suggests that the duty imposed by
Rule 8.1(a) relates both to "a lawyer's own admission" and to "that of
others.15 1 Rule 8.1(a) therefore goes further than DR 1-101(A) of the
Code by requiring the lawyer not only to refrain from furthering the application of an unqualified applicant, but also to furnish unsolicited information to the admitting authorities whenever he knows that a
"misapprehension [has] arisen in the matter. ' 52 The rule appears to require that lawyers inform even where silence would neither constitute an
implied false representation nor advance the applicant's prospects for
admission.
One significant limitation, however, makes it probable that lawyers
will rarely be obligated to report information concerning bar applicants.
Because Rule 8.1(a) applies only when the lawyer comes to know that
the admitting authority is operating under a misapprehension, no ethical
duty arises if the lawyer simply avoids knowledge of the admitting committee's collective state of mind. In our example, even though Straight
has reason to believe that Cool is prepared to deceive the character committee with regard to his use of drugs, he does not "know" whether the
committee will inquire into the matter, or alternatively, whether it will
actually be misled. Straight therefore will not violate Rule 8.1(b) if he
49. Id. Rule 8.1(a).
50. First of all, the rule applies generally to "a" bar admission application, not to "his" application. Id. Cf MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-101(A) (1981) (using the
phrase "his application for admission to the bar"). In any event, because Rule 8.1(a) explicitly
applies to any "applicant for admission to the bar," a special provision for applicants who were
already lawyers would be surplusage. Moreover, the phrase "in connection with a bar admission
application" is parallel with "in connection with a disciplinary matter"; the latter phrase suggests an
application not confined to a lawyer's own disciplinary matter. Finally, the reference to an exception
for confidential information suggests that the rule applies to admission matters involving others;
one's own application for admission would not ordinarily involve privileged information.
51.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 comment (1983).

52. Id. Rule 8.1(b).

504
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3
keeps his knowledge of Cool's drug use to himself.
In short, although the approach under the Model Rules varies somewhat from that under the Code, the conclusions reached are similar. The
Code clearly imposes an obligation to report unfavorable information regarding applicants only upon admitted lawyers. Bar applicants such as
Straight are not obliged to report. The Model Rules are more obscure on
this point. Although they appear to govern both lawyers and applicants,
a close reading of the relevant language reveals an ambiguity about the
breadth of the obligation imposed upon applicants.
Apart from the question of who is subject to the applicable rules, the
Model Rules and the Code contain somewhat different standards regarding what kind of information must be disclosed. The Code does not require a lawyer who is not himself somehow implicated in the admission

53. In fact, Rule 8.1 may impose no reporting duty at all upon Straight. Although the obligations set out in Rule 8.1 apparently apply equally to lawyers and applicants, a closer reading suggests
that if Straight were not already admitted to the bar, he would not be obligated to report Cool's drug
use even if he knew that the character committee labored under a misapprehension. Rule 8.1 provides in part:
An applicant for admission to the bar... shall not.., fail to disclose a fact necessary to
correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter ....
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1(b) (1983) (emphasis added). The italicized

phrase has no antecedent reference. This portion of Rule 8.1 makes sense only if "the matter" refers
to the applicant's own application. To be contrasted is the rule's coverage of lawyers:
[A] lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not... fail to... correct a misapprehension known ... to have arisen in
the matter ....
Id. Here, "the matter" clearly refers to a "bar admission application" or "disciplinary matter." It is
clear that "the matter" in this case refers to any bar application, not just the lawyer's own. See
supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 8.1 comment (1983) (noting that Rule 8.1 applies to lawyers in connection with both their own
and others' applications, but containing no reference to applicants). Although this result was probably not intended, see id. ("The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to
the bar as well as to lawyers."), one can nonetheless argue that despite its otherwise equal treatment
of lawyers and applicants, Rule 8.1 imposes no obligation at all upon bar applicants, as distinct from
bar members, to volunteer information concerning other applicants.
Applicants are, however, required by Rule 8.1(b) to respond to any lawful demand from an
admission authority, a requirement not limited to any particular "matter," and therefore presumably
applicable to demands for information about other applicants. See MODEL RULES

OF

PROFES-

Rule 8.1(b) (1983). An interesting anomaly would exist, however, if applicants
were required to volunteer information concerning other applicants. Our discussion of Straight's
obligations under the Code assumed that although Straight is not directly governed by the Code, he
should nevertheless be concerned about the possibility that the admitting authority would hold him
to those standards that govern admitted lawyers. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
Thus Straight's failure to report Cool-assuming that a like failure on the part of an admitted
lawyer would warrant disciplinary action-could lead to the denial of Straight's admission, Would
the same scenario be possible under the Model Rules, which directly regulate Straight's conduct in
the preadmission phase and yet do not require one in his position to volunteer information? In the
final analysis, this conundrum raises the question whether admitting authorities can or should apply
stricter standards than those found in the mandatory rules of the profession.
SIONAL CONDUCT
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application to disclose information; his only mandatory obligation is to
avoid "furthering" the application, and then only when he "knows" that
the applicant is unqualified.5 4 In contrast, the Model Rules require lawyers to disclose any information that they know is necessary to correct
"misapprehensions" on the part of the admitting authorities. 55 The obligation under the Model Rules is broader in that it extends to derogatory
information that is not totally disqualifying. The obligation under the
Model Rules is at the same time narrower, however, in that it does
not arise until the lawyer becomes aware of a specific factual
56
misapprehension.
Although differences between the two standards can thus be identified, one similarity is clear: the obligations imposed by the Code and the
Model Rules are both exceptionally narrow. Whatever the differences in
formulation and applicability, it would be an extremely rare case in
which either standard would require a lawyer to report information bearing on the character of an applicant. Indeed, far from requiring lawyers
to play active roles in policing the bar admission process, both rules tend
to encourage lawyers to distance themselves from that process and avoid
57
any knowledge pertaining to the character of applicants.
B. Informing and Lawyers.
1. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility. The case of
Pinstripe and Mouthpiece differs from that of Cool and Straight in that it
involves a disciplinary problem rather than a bar admission problem.
With respect to disciplinary matters, the Code is much less equivocal; it
backs its encouragement of whistle-blowing 58 with a specific requirement
in the Disciplinary Rules. DR 1-103(A) states that a lawyer having "unprivileged knowledge of a violation" of any Disciplinary Rule "shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to
54. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
56. Thus, under the Model Rules, a lawyer presumably may even further the application of a
concededly unqualified applicant, so long as he can do so without making a false statement and
without failing to correct a known misapprehension.
57. Although both operate to discourage lawyers from becoming too involved in bar admission
matters, the rules are not identical: the Code requires only that the lawyer not involve himself
affirmatively in supporting the application of one having a dubious character, MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-101(B) (1981); the Model Rules, in effect, require lawyers to
avoid learning anything about such applications. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 8.1 (1983).
58. EC 1-4 provides that "[a] lawyer should reveal voluntarily to [the proper] officials all unprivileged knowledge of conduct of lawyers which he believes clearly to be in violation of the Disciplinary Rules." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-4 (1981).
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investigate or act upon such violation." 59
Assuming Pinstripe suspects that Mouthpiece has violated a Disciplinary Rule, what degree of certainty on her part is required to trigger
the mandatory reporting requirement? The knowledge requirement in

DR 1-103(A) presumably applies both to the factual question whether
Mouthpiece has actually cheated on his taxes and to the legal question

whether such conduct violates a Disciplinary Rule. Uncertainty may exist in this case with regard to both questions. As to the factual question,
Pinstripe has not actually seen Mouthpiece do anything illegal; she has
only heard him say that he has cheated on his taxes. Mouthpiece could

merely be bragging. As to the legal question, it is not immediately clear
that Mouthpiece's proclaimed acts constitute a violation of a Disciplinary Rule. Where should Pinstripe look for guidance?
Any uncertainty about whether a violation has actually occurred
undermines the obligation to report under DR 1-103(A). The rule does
not require lawyers to report mere information suggesting that a viola-

tion may have occurred. The disclosure requirement applies only to one
having "knowledge" of a violation. 60 The term "knowledge" is not de-

fined in the Code, although it is an important term in several provisions. 61 Interpretative problems have consequently arisen, most notably
with respect to the provision prohibiting a lawyer from "[k]nowingly"
62
using perjured testimony.

59. Id. DR 1-103(A) (emphasis added). Literally, DR 1-103 requires lawyers to report violations of DR 1-102. Because DR 1-102(A)(1) forbids violation of any Disciplinary Rule, the reporting requirement applies to all ethical violations.
Of those jurisdictions that have adopted some version of the Code, only three seem to have had
serious qualms about its formulation of the reporting requirement. Although no state has amended
EC 1-4, Massachusetts, Washington, and the District of Columbia have declined to adopt DR I103(A). CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE, supra note 33, Canon 1 at 5-6. For a
reference to the legislative history of the Massachusetts Code, see Kaufman, supranote 8, at 307-08.
The California Rules of Professional Conduct do not contain a provision requiring reporting of
misconduct. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
60. A comparison of DR 1-103(A) with DR 1-103(B), which requires revelation of "knowledge
or evidence upon proper request of a [disciplinary] tribunal," MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(B) (1981) (emphasis added), suggests that "knowledge of a violation" does
not mean "evidence of a violation." Thus, "evidence" is to be supplied on request, but only "knowledge" is to be reported sua sponte.
61. See, eg., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1981) (adopting
a knowledge standard in several prohibitions). The Model Rules, in contrast, define knowledge as
"actual knowledge of the facts in question." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology (1983). This definition sets a high standard of factual knowledge, but may not require knowledge of the legal effect of known facts.
62. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1981) ("In his repre.
sentation of a client, a lawyer shall not ... [k]nowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.").
Some commentators have taken a cynical view of the knowledge requirement. The American Trial
Lawyers Foundation has noted:
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As we might expect, the Code's Ethical Considerations encourage
reporting in a broader range of situations. EC 1-4 uses the more expansive term "belief" in at least one place: a lawyer is admonished to report
any unprivileged "knowledge of conduct.., which he believes clearly to
be in violation of the Disciplinary Rules. ' 63 Yet on close reading, the
apparent breadth of this admonition evaporates. In the first place, the
"belief" standard applies only to the legal question, i.e., the question of
whether a violation has been committed. As to factual matters, EC 1-4 is
consistent with DR 1-103(A): the lawyer is urged to report only conduct
of which he has "knowledge." 64
Even with respect to the legal question, EC 1-4 does not require the
lawyer to report conduct that he merely believes constitutes a violation of
the Code. Only conduct he believes is clearly in violation falls within EC
1-4. This formulation is perhaps a bit broader than that found in DR 1103(A). For if a lawyer has any question at all about the meaning or
scope of a rule, he can plausibly claim that he does not "know" that a
particular type of conduct violates that rule. In such case, the actual
knowledge standard found in DR 1-103(A) would not be met. The same
lawyer, however, might nevertheless believe it is clear that a violation has
occurred. In that case, the lawyer would be obligated to disclose under
EC 1-4. But this distinction is not an easy one to make. In any event,
EC 1-4 is hardly a sweeping mandate to report any conduct that might
fairly be thought to violate a Disciplinary Rule.
It is doubtful whether Pinstripe could be found to have actual
"knowledge" of misconduct on the part of Mouthpiece. In criminal
cases, 6 5 a finding of "willful blindness" or "conscious avoidance" may
satisfy the mens rea requirement of knowledge.6 6 As the Model Penal
[T]he most common device for avoiding responsibility, or for declaring apparent strict obligations but ignoring their violations, is to set an impracticable standard of knowledge.
There really are lawyers who assert that they would never knowingly present perjury to the
court, but then observe that in years of trial practice, they have never "known" that perjury was being offered. Occasionally, the sophistry is added that one can never "know"
what was true or false until the jury returns its verdict.
ATLF CODE, supra note 33, Introductory Comment at 5. See also G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra
note 4, at 339-44.
63. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-4 (1981).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(b), 2.02(7) (1962); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(2)
(McKinney 1975). The definitions of knowledge used in the criminal context provide a useful analogy in construing the codes of professional conduct because they have proven practicable in the
context of judging human behavior against statutory norms. Furthermore, it cannot plausibly be
argued that the knowledge standard should be more solicitous of defendants in professional grievance proceedings than of defendants in criminal cases.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Cano, 702 F.2d 370, 371 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming conviction for
knowingly and intentionally importing and possessing cocaine based on charge that the jury might
find the requisite knowledge if they found that the defendant "was aware of a high probability that
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Code puts it, knowledge can be established "if a person is aware of a high

'67
probability of [a fact], unless he actually believes that it does not exist."
But even this broader standard may not be applicable here. Can it really

be said that Pinstripe is "aware of a high probability" that Mouthpiece

has in fact violated the tax laws-particularly since she has neither a
duty nor the capability to conduct a further investigation into the
68
matter?

As noted earlier, Pinstripe's duty to report under DR 1-103(A)
arises only if she has knowledge both that Mouthpiece actually engaged
in misconduct and that his misconduct violated a Disciplinary Rule.
Even assuming Pinstripe does "know" that Mouthpiece is a tax evader, it
does not necessarily follow that she also "knows" that he has violated a
Disciplinary Rule. Pinstripe presumably would be charged with knowledge of the Code's content. However, there may be a question whether

the particular conduct violated a specific Disciplinary Rule.
This question raises the problem of the lawyer's ethical duty to obey

the law. Of course, it goes without saying that lawyers are not exempt
from the general obligation to obey the law. On the contrary, one is
tempted to say that lawyers have a special obligation to obey the law-

though what is "special" about this obligation is not immediately
obvious.
The Code flirts with the rhetoric of special obligation. EC 1-5
states:
A lawyer... should refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible
conduct. Because of his position in society, even minor violations of
law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession. Obedience to law exemplifies respect for law. To lawyers
es69
pecially, respect for the law should be more than a platitude.
This exhortation perhaps gives some meaning to the notion of a special
obligation. Although all members of society are generally bound to obey
laws, the average citizen probably makes some distinction between major
the envelopes contained drugs, but deliberately closed his eyes to that probability"); United States v.
Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287 (2d Cir.) (affirming conviction based on charge that "reckless disregard"
coupled with "conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth" would establish knowledge), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1962).
68. "Conscious avoidance" cases typically involve defendants who deliberately ignore the existence of certain facts, or who have some responsibility for the situation about which they claim to be
ignorant. See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700-04 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (affirming
conviction for possession of marijuana), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
69. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1981). Only North Carolina
has seen fit to tamper with this formulation; that state's version omits the first full sentence of the
excerpt quoted in the text. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE, supra note 33,

Canon 1 at 2.
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and minor violations. The sentiment expressed in EC 1-5 seems to be
that the lawyer, having a special relation to the law, ought to have a
particular reverence for even minor regulations and should strive to be a
model of responsible behavior.
But even if lawyers have a special obligation to respect the law scru-

pulously, it does not follow that any deviation from the law is inconsistent with the fundamental obligations, or even aspirations, of the bar.
Two areas can be identified in which professional discipline for violations
of the law should perhaps be limited.
The first area is that of de minimis violations. Intentional double-

parking, for example, does not indicate to most people disrespect for the
law. Where the line separating substantial from de minimis violations is

to be drawn is, of course, an issue about which considerable disagreement
is possible. But wherever the line is drawn, it seems clear that some vio-

lations are properly viewed as too minor to warrant professional
discipline.
The second and more controversial area is that of violations that
have no direct bearing on the lawyer's capacity to perform his job. It
could be argued that even a serious offense should not be grounds for
professional discipline unless the offense bears on the lawyer's professional attributes. 70 When we speak of a lawyer's moral fitness to practice

law, we do not mean that a lawyer must possess irreproachable morals,
but only that a lawyer should have those moral traits necessary to carry

out specific professional responsibilities. 71 A lawyer who commits an assault may be a reprehensible person, but it is at least questionable
whether such conduct has a direct enough bearing on his professional
competence to warrant professional discipline. 72 It might even be argued
70. See generally G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 4, at 565-66 (if criminal conduct is
"wholly unrelated to the lawyer's professional life," professional discipline may not be warranted).
71. The code proposed by the American Trial Lawyers Foundation recognizes this point by
providing that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in criminal or otherwise unlawful conduct that creates a
substantial doubt that the lawyer will comply with this Code of Conduct." ATLF CODE, supra note
33, Rule 8.1. This formulation seems preferable to both the Code's "moral turpitude" standard and
the Model Rules' "fitness as a lawyer" standard. The Model Rules' standard suggests an attempt to
identify those who are in some absolute way "unfit ...for membership in an honorable profession."
G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 4, at 568. Such an enterprise is highly dubious. For accounts
of the class origins of rules designed to ensure that all lawyers would be, in a literal sense, gentlemen,
see generally J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976), and Rhode, supra note 18, at 529-45.
72. Professors Hazard and Hodes discuss the example of assault in a way that illustrates both
the right and the wrong way to approach the question. For them, an assault may or may not reflect
adversely on fitness to practice law, depending on the circumstances. An isolated emotional outburst, perhaps influenced by intoxication, may be irrelevant; a premeditated assault growing out of a
long-nurtured grudge, on the other hand, might "manifest a character not to be trusted with important controversies." G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 4, at 568. Although this particular assessment seems faulty, the inquiry is properly focused on the extent to which the particular conduct
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that dishonesty in personal affairs-for example, cheating on one's personal income tax-is not predictive of a lawyer's inability to conduct
himself honestly in the course of his professional endeavors. On the
other hand, an infraction that appears de minimis in an objective sense
might be of major significance when committed in connection with a lawyer's job. For example, a minor misstatement on a form submitted to a
federal agency may be innocuous in a generic sense, but a misstatement
of a lawyer's fee in a declaration filed in a bankruptcy proceeding bears
directly on that lawyer's professional integrity.
Whether the ethical obligation to obey the law should be suspended
in these two areas depends in large part on the purpose of the Code itself.
To the extent that the object of the Code is to define the types of offenses
that warrant serious professional sanctions, it seems obvious that a lawyer should not be disbarred for de minimis violations such as doubleparking. On the other hand, all systems of conduct regulation include
general prohibitions that are intended to encompass de minimis violations. A code of professional conduct, like a criminal code, sets standards of behavior. To the extent that the object of the Code is to set a
standard of conduct higher than that imposed upon the general population, it might well be reasonable to expect strict adherence to the law,
even the most trivial traffic regulation. It might then be left to the discretion of disciplinary authorities to determine the need for enforcement and
73
punishment in particular cases.
The Code looks in two directions with respect to the ethical obligation to obey the law. The Ethical Considerations state a very broad norm
against even de minimis violations. 74 The Disciplinary Rules, however,
set a much narrower standard. Under DR 1-102(A)(3), a lawyer may be
75
disciplined for engaging in "illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
"Moral turpitude" is hardly a precise standard, 76 but it would seem to
reflects adversely on fitness to practice law. But when Professors Hazard and Hodes go on to consider whether such an offense bears on the lawyer's fitness "for decent society, let alone for membership in an honorable profession," id. at 568, the inquiry becomes perverted.
73. Of course, if the question is what sort of violation or suspected violation by one lawyer
should another lawyer be required to report to a disciplinary body, additional considerations come
into play. It is not obvious that a reporting obligation should be coextensive with the full range of
conduct subject to criminal prosecution, much less with that of conduct that should be subject to
disciplinary sanctions.
74. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1981).
75. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(3) (1981). Of the states
that have adopted the Code, only Massachusetts has deleted this rule. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE, supra note 33, Canon 1 at 4.
76. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has observed, with some degree of understatement, that this phrase "eludes precise definition." In re Wolff, 490 A.2d 1118, 1119 (D.C.), vacated,
494 A.2d 932 (1985) (en banc). The court's observation is borne out by its own attempt to define
moral turpitude:
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encompass only serious violations of the law. 77 Whatever the precise
meaning of the "moral turpitude" restriction, it is clear that a lawyer's
violation of the law, even the criminal law, is insufficient in itself to warrant professional discipline.
The question of Pinstripe's obligation to report thus turns in part on
whether tax evasion is "illegal conduct involving moral turpitude" under
DR 1-102(A)(3). The Code fails to provide clear guidelines; case law
could presumably provide interpretative guidance in particular jurisdictions. 78 In any event, the fact that Mouthpiece's suspected conduct is
criminal does not definitively resolve the matter.
Even if the "moral turpitude" provision does not cover tax evasion,
other rules of conduct may apply. As already noted, EC 1-5 states that a
lawyer should refrain not only from illegal conduct, but also from all

"morally reprehensible conduct.

'79

Although opinions concerning this

provision's substantive content may vary, many people would no doubt

interpret it to mean that lawyers should not engage in adultery, malicious
gossip, or shabby business practices. Tax evasion would presumably fall
80
well within this category.

At first blush, this observation has no direct bearing on Pinstripe's
problem because the reporting requirement in DR 1-103(A) applies only
to violations of Disciplinary Rules. A failure to live up to the aspirational norms set out in the Ethical Considerations would seem to be irrel(1) The act denounced by the statute offends the generally accepted moral code of
mankind;
(2) The act is one of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which
a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man; or
(3) Conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Id. (citing In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1168 (D.C. 1979)). The confusion that has resulted from
this definition is documented in Rhode, supra note 18, at 552-55.
77. See, eg., In re Burch, 73 Ohio App. 97, 102, 54 N.E.2d 803, 806 (1943) (term "moral
turpitude" in statute providing for disbarment "contemplates something more than conviction of a
crime"; failure to register as a foreign agent not a crime involving moral turpitude); In re Rothrock,
16 Cal. 2d 449, 458-59, 106 P.2d 907, 912 (1940) (assault with deadly weapon not a crime involving
moral turpitude).
Although some jurisdictions apply the moral turpitude standard without regard to whether the
misconduct in question has a bearing on professional capacity, see, eg., In re Wilson, 391 S.W.2d
914, 917-18 (Mo. 1965) (discipline appropriate for misconduct "outside the scope of... professional
relations"), three jurisdictions-Georgia, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia-have limited
the rule to "professional" conduct or conduct that "reflects on [the lawyer's] fitness to practice law."
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE, supra note 33, Canon 1 at 4.

78. As might be expected, decisions have gone both ways. See In re Fahey, 8 Cal. 3d 842, 85253 & nn. 7-10, 505 P.2d 1369, 1375 & nn. 7-10, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313, 319 & nn. 7-10 (1973) (noting
split among state courts on question whether failure to file a tax return involves moral turpitude).
79. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1981).

80. Presumably, conduct can be "morally reprehensible" under EC 1-5 without necessarily involving "moral turpitude" under DR 1-102(A)(3). Once again, however, it must be borne in mind
that the Ethical Considerations are not drafted with the precision of statutes.
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evant for disciplinary purposes. Nonetheless, other Disciplinary Rules
pick up the theme found in EC 1-5 and forbid conduct that is not necessarily illegal. Thus, Pinstripe might be obliged to report Mouthpiece's
con.duct even if DR 1-102(A)(3) does not apply.
For example, DR 1-102(A)(6), which forbids "conduct that adversely reflects on [a lawyer's] fitness to practice law," 81 may be applicable. Because this rule specifically focuses on the lawyer's fitness to
practice law, the moral quality of the lawyer's life outside the office
should arguably be irrelevant. But it is not clear that the Code's drafters
intended such an interpretation. After all, the Code makes few distinctions between private and professional integrity and in fact imposes many
obligations that apply outside the courtroom and office.8 2 Moreover, DR
1-102(A)(6) itself prohibits not only conduct that demonstrates unfitness,
but also conduct that "adversely reflects on"8 3 the lawyer's fitness-an
expansive formulation indeed.
Of course, Mouthpiece's conduct is by no means borderline.
Mouthpiece has committed a serious criminal act. One could readily
conclude that such conduct does indeed reflect adversely on Mouthpiece's fitness to practice law and, therefore, violates DR 1-102(A)(6).
But the imprecise language of the rule and the existence of rules more
specifically applicable to the situation make it difficult to conclude with
certainty that Pinstripe has a duty to report under DR 1-102(A)(6).
One of those more specific rules clearly covers the situation. DR 1102(A)(4) forbids any "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. '8 4 Under this standard, even acts that are not illegal
may be subject to professional discipline. Thus, although the Code does
not require one to report all criminal conduct, it can easily be read to
require one to report any instance of conduct involving deception or
mendacity. Accordingly, if Pinstripe knows that Mouthpiece has failed
to report taxable income, she has a duty to report that information to the
disciplinary authorities. If she fails to do so, Pinstripe herself may be
subject to disciplinary action.
81. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1981).
82. See, eg., id. DR 1-102(A)(3), 1-102(A)(4) (forbidding "illegal conduct involving moral turpitude" and "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation").
83. Id. DR 1-102(A)(6). As a practical matter, of course, it is difficult to conclude that DR I102(A)(6), in combination with DR 1-103(A), imposes an enforceable obligation on lawyers to report their colleagues' noncriminal misconduct outside the professional context. Despite the Code
drafters' apparent desire to leave open the possibility of discipline for noncriminal, "morally reprehensible" conduct unrelated to professional shortcomings, examples of discipline on the basis of such
a theory are few. In such cases it is difficult for a lawyer, even with full knowledge of the relevant
facts, to conclude that he has "knowledge" that a colleague's conduct violates DR 1-102(A)(6).
84. Id. DR 1-102(A)(4).
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2. The Model Rules. Model Rule 8.3(a) deviates from DR 1103(A) in several respects. The Model Rules require a lawyer "having
knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the rules of
professional conduct" to inform the disciplinary authorities only if the
violation "raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." 8 5 As the commentary following Rule 8.3 acknowledges, compliance requires "a measure of
judgment. ' 86 Clearly, the rigid reporting requirement found in DR 1103(A) 87 is absent.
Rule 8.3(a) specifically requires that the misconduct be serious
before any obligation to inform arises. The conduct must raise a "substantial question" concerning the lawyer's professional competence. The
commentary following Rule 8.3 notes that "[t]he term 'substantial' refers
to the seriousness of the possible offense and not to the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware." '88 The meaning that this comment
affirmatively attributes to the rule seems so obvious that the comment
appears curiously superfluous. The syntax of the rule makes clear that
"substantial" refers to the degree to which the violation affects one's assessment of the lawyer's fitness, rather than the degree to which one is
certain that an actual violation has occurred. Nevertheless, the negative
implication of the comment is quite suggestive. Deviating from the approach taken in the Code, the commentary following Rule 8.3 seems to
suggest that something less than a substantial quantum of evidence could
trigger the reporting obligation. The statement that the reporting requirement is conditioned upon the seriousness of the "possible" offense
gives rise to the same implication.
Under this interpretation, it would appear that Pinstripe has a clear
duty to report. The language of Rule 8.3, however, does not fully support this interpretation. Under Rule 8.3, as under DR 1-103(A), a duty
to report arises only if the lawyer has "knowledge" of a violation. 89 Because the commentary following Rule 8.3 only clarifies what the adjective "substantial" is intended to modify, Rule 8.3 probably requires the
85. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1983).
86. Id. Rule 8.3 comment. The American Trial Lawyers Foundation criticizes the "undefined
standard of 'fitness to practice law,'" finding it just as "unfairly vague" as the "elusive concept of
moral turpitude." ATLF CODE, supra note 33, at 44. One of the drafters of the Model Rules
concedes that Rule 8.3 "is not wholly free from vagueness," but correctly notes that "its focus on the
relationship to fitness as a lawyer is a major improvement." G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supranote 4,
at 566.
87. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
88. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 comment (1983).
89. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1983) with MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (1981).
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same kind of knowledge that is required under DR 1-103(A). 90
Assuming that the same knowledge requirement applies, we must

first ask whether Pinstripe knows that Mouthpiece has violated one of
the Model Rules. Again, the question arises whether a lawyer who vio-

lates the law automatically violates the rules of professional conduct.
Here, too, the Model Rules deviate from the Code. Unlike the Code,
which focuses on acts involving "moral turpitude," 91 the Model Rules

focus directly on how the act in question bears on the lawyer's professional relationships.9 2 Thus, the Model Rules require disciplinary action

where the lawyer "commit[s] a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects."' 93 This standard covers tax evasion more clearly than does the
Code's "moral turpitude" standard. 94 Thus, it seems clear that Mouthpiece's conduct violates his professional obligations under the Model
95
Rules.
But the analysis does not stop there. Rule 8.3 requires that lawyers
report only serious violations of professional discipline. 96 In determining
whether the violation is serious, consideration is to be given to the same
90. The Model Rules might even be read as precluding application of the criminal law concept
of "conscious avoidance." The Model Rules, unlike the Code, include a brief definitions section.
That section states that "knowledge" denotes only "actual knowledge." MODEL RULES OF PROFEsSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology (1983).
91. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILITY DR 1-102(A)(3) (1981); see supra notes
75-77 and accompanying text.
92. It is interesting to note, however, that the Model Rules drop the Code's prohibition of
noncriminal conduct "adversely reflect[ing on ...fitness to practice law." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1981). This is an appropriate change; the Code's formulation is too broad to be of value.
93. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (1983). The phraseology of the
rule suggests that "honesty," "trustworthiness," and "fitness" are distinct concepts, but the distinctions are nowhere spelled out.
94. Indeed, the comment to Rule 8.4 explicitly states that "willful failure to file an income tax
return" is the kind of misconduct to which Rule 8.4(b) applies, and that the "reflects adversely on
... honesty [or] fitness" standard was deliberately chosen over the "moral turpitude" standard to
eliminate the possibility of professional discipline for "offenses concerning some matters of personal
morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 8.4 comment (1983).
95. Interestingly, the Model Rules retain the Code's prohibition of "conduct [whether or not in
violation of law] involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." Compare MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(c) (1983) with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1981). This prohibition would seem to make redundant the portions

of Rule 8.4(b) that are specific, because criminal acts that would "reflect[] adversely on [a] lawyer's
honesty [or] trustworthiness" would already be covered by the prohibition of conduct "involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
8.4(c) (1983). Rule 8.4(b) then has separate force only insofar as it allows discipline for criminal acts
that reflect adversely on "fitness as a lawyer in other respects," a standard no less vague, but at least
more appropriately framed, than the Code's "moral turpitude" standard.
96. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1983).
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factors that define what crimes constitute violations in the first place. In
each case, the focus is on the impact upon one's assessment of the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or professional fitness. The degree of impact required, however, does differ slightly: Mouthpiece violates Rule
8.4(b) if his crime "reflects adversely" 97 on those qualities; Pinstripe
must report him under Rule 8.3 if the crime "raises a substantial ques-

tion" 98 about them. Although there may be a narrow category of offenses involving dishonesty that do not raise such substantial questions, 99

tax evasion is probably not among them. Thus, if Mouthpiece did indeed
commit the crime in question, Pinstripe is obliged to report him under
the Model Rules.100
C. Some PreliminaryObservations.

The foregoing analysis suggests that a lawyer's obligation to report
the misconduct of other lawyers is far from absolute. First, the obliga-

tion has limited application in the bar admission process. Under the
Code, bar applicants generally have no express duty to report the mis-

conduct of other applicants. Similarly, bar members have no duty to
volunteer information, however devastating that information may be.
97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (1983).

98. Id. Rule 8.3.
99. Some might argue that a minor theft of services, such as an unauthorized splicing into a
cable television connection, or the use of a slug in a subway turnstile, does not raise substantial
questions. But see Feliner v. Bar Ass'n, 213 Md. 243, 247, 131 A.2d 729, 731-32 (1957) (lawyer
disbarred for regularly using slugs in parking meters).
100. For criminal conduct not involving dishonesty, the outcome would be considerably less
clear. Consider the outcome under the Model Rules if Cool and Straight were lawyers rather than
bar applicants. Under the Code, as we have seen, the analysis would be straightforward: a lawyer
must report any violation of a Disciplinary Rule of which he has knowledge; it is a violation of a
Disciplinary Rule to commit a crime involving moral turpitude; and the distribution of controlled
substances is generally considered to fall within this category. See supra note 24. Under the Model
Rules, the question is whether Cool's use or distribution of drugs "reflects adversely on [his] honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects" so as to constitute professional misconduct
under Rule 8.4, and, if it does, whether it "raises a substantial question about" those qualities so as
to require Straight to inform under Rule 8.3. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rules 8.3, 8.4 (1983).
With respect to drug use, the answer to this question is hardly free from doubt. The Model
Rules give no guidance. The commentary following Rule 8.4 states that the rule does not cover
"offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 comment (1983). But the comment does not

discuss whether consumption or noncommercial distribution of controlled substances fall within this
category.
Some would no doubt argue that offenses involving certain drugs concern matters of personal
morality. Cf Ravin v. Alaska, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975) (possession of marijuana by adults
at home protected under state constitutional right to privacy). Others might see a direct link between controlled substances and erratic behavior, financial irresponsibility, or violent crime. In any
event, it would seem difficult to say on the basis of the available materials that Straight has knowledge of a violation of Rule 8.4.
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The Code merely prohibits admitted attorneys from furthering the application of persons known to be unqualified-a singularly narrow category
of candidates.
The Model Rules impose a stricter reporting requirement. Despite
some ambiguity in drafting, the Model Rules apparently impose
equivalent obligations upon applicants and admitted attorneys. The
Model Rules, like the Code, do not generally require that adverse or even
disqualifying information be reported. The disclosure requirements
found in the Model Rules come into play only when the lawyer is aware
that the admitting authorities labor under some misapprehension about
the applicant's qualifications. Because a lawyer who is not in some way
actively involved in the admissions process will rarely satisfy this condition, the disclosure requirements found in the Model Rules probably do
not in a practical sense differ significantly from those found in the Code.
The Code is more demanding with respect to the lawyer's obligation
to report the misconduct of other members of the bar. The Code requires lawyers to report ethical violations of which they have "unprivileged knowledge." This requirement is in fact quite narrow.
Misconduct other than known violations of Disciplinary Rules is not
covered at all. Moreover, the "knowledge" requirement seems to exempt
the lawyer who has good faith questions about whether a violation has
actually occurred. Because a lawyer will rarely know all the facts, and
because the Disciplinary Rules are riddled with difficult interpretative
questions, rarely will a duty to report actually arise.
Nonetheless, the Code's reporting requirement does apply to any
known violation of the Disciplinary Rules, regardless of the seriousness
of the violation or its bearing on professional fitness. In contrast, the
Model Rules limit the reporting obligation to known violations that
"raise[] a substantial question as to [the violator's] honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer." 10 1 This standard requires the would-be informer to exercise his own judgment in the matter, thus injecting
additional uncertainty into any effort to enforce the duty to report.
The overall pattern reveals a consistent ambivalence toward reporting. On the one hand, the Code's aspirational provisions exhort lawyers
to report all misconduct having any bearing on bar admission or disciplinary matters.102 Even the Code's enforceable rules include a reporting
obligation that is ostensibly quite broad. On the other hand, the commitment to informing that the rules purport to embrace is circumscribed in a
number of ways. Even the aspirational norms warn against judging
101.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1983).

102. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-3 to 1-5.

Vol. 1986:491)

THE LAWYER AS INFORMER

others and meddling in others' affairs10 3 and contain expressions of hesitancy about the principal thrust of the rule. 104 Moreover, the duty to
report diminishes drastically in the transition between moral aspiration
and enforceable rule.
It is inevitable that some slippage will occur in any such transition.
The practical realities of enforcement surely have something to do with
this. Furthermore, considerations of fairness counsel the inclusion of
carefully specified and manageable standards of knowledge and intent.
Yet the difference between aspirations and binding rules cannot fully explain the contradictory rhetoric found even in the hortatory portions of
the Code. I suggest that the failure of the model codes to follow through
on the general proclamations of a duty to inform stems from a deep ambivalence that lawyers share with other members of society about the
moral status of informing. Moreover, I assert that this ambivalence is
appropriate.
To substantiate this assertion, I turn to the reporting obligations
that society imposes upon persons outside the legal profession.
II.

INFORMING AND THE LAW:

How NONLAWYERS LIVE

The hypothetical cases discussed above share a common feature. In
each, the misconduct of the lawyer or bar applicant constitutes not
merely a violation of a professional code, but also a serious criminal offense. These examples have been chosen deliberately for the purpose of
highlighting the contrast between the reporting obligations imposed upon
lawyers and those imposed upon the general population. Although the
duty of lawyers to report the misconduct of their fellow lawyers is in
some respects ambiguous, this duty is not matched by any comparable
obligation on the part of the general population to report criminal activi1
ties to law enforcement authorities. 05
A.

The Absence of an Obligation to Inform.

Some courts and commentators have asserted that members of the
general population are under, or should be under, an enforceable obligation to report crimes, or at least felonies, that come to their attention.106
Failure to report a known felon was supposedly a misdemeanor at com103. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
105. The absence of any general legal obligation to inform was noted by former Justice John
Spalding of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in his recommendation against Massachusetts' adoption of DR 1-103(A). See A. KAuFMAN, supra note 8,at 307-08.
106. See, e.g., Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1962 A.C. 528, 555 (1961) ('Ever since
the days of hue and cry, it has been the duty of a man, who knows that a felony has been committed,
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mon law.10 7
This misdemeanor-misprision of felony-evidently still exists in
England.108 Nonetheless, its history hardly supports the view that informing is genuinely regarded as a moral duty. Some commentators
have expressed doubt whether the offense "ever had a meaningful existence beyond the textbook writers." 10 9 In any event, by Victorian times,
the offense was already considered "practically obsolete." 110 Only a
handful of successful prosecutions have been reported in England since
1938.111
On this side of the Atlantic, the common law offense of misprision

never took root.1 12 The United States Supreme Court criticized the doctrine in an early case. Chief Justice John Marshall stated:
to report it to the proper authority so that steps can be taken to apprehend the felon and bring him
to justice.").
107. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 141, at 423 (2d ed. 1961);
Howard, Misprisions, Compoundings and Compromises, 1959 CRIM. L. REv. 750, 751.
108. See Sykes, 1962 A.C. at 555.
109. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 526 (1972) (citing Glazebrook, Misprision of
Felony-Shadow of Felony: An Old Concept in a New Context, 52 A.B.A. J. 148 (1966)); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 commentary at 256 (1980) ("[T]here is scant evidence of enforcement
of misprision penalties in the absence of affirmative acts of assistance that would in any event render
the actor liable at common law as an accessory after the fact to the original crime.").
110. 2 J.STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 238 (1883).
111. Professor Williams in 1961 noted only four such cases since 1938. See G. WILLIAMS, supra
note 107, at 424-26. Only one successful prosecution has been reported since 1961. See Regina v.
Lucraft, 50 Crim. App. 296 (1966). Counsel for appellant in Sykes claimed that there had been no
misprision prosecutions at all between 1900 and 1938. They also noted a few cases not discussed by
Williams in which either defendants pleaded guilty to misprision as part of a plea bargain or the
misprision charge was dropped or dismissed. Sykes, 1962 A.C. at 535-36.
The sentences imposed in reported misprision prosecutions have been light. In the three cases
since 1940, the defendants were either sentenced concurrently with another offense, unconditionally
discharged, or sentenced to time served. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 107, at 424-26. In most of the
cases, the defendant was apparently guilty of more than a mere failure to inform. In Sykes, for
example, the evidence showed that the defendant, charged with misprision of the theft of a large
quantity of weapons from a United States Air Force base, had approached a police informer with an
offer to arrange the sale of the weapons to the Irish Republican Army. Sykes, 1962 A.C. at 552. See
also id. at 535-36 (discussing prior cases).
Even against this backdrop of relatively infrequent prosecutions, commentators have criticized
the sweep of the common law formulation as "unreasonably wide." G. WILLIAMS, supra note 107,
at 423. The more recent decisions have responded to this criticism. In Sykes, the House of Lords
apparently held that misprision is applicable not to all felonies, but only to those so serious in nature
that anyone would know that they ought to report. Furthermore, the House of Lords apparently
held that nondisclosure would not be punishable when the nondisclosing party acted under a good
faith claim of right. Sykes, 1962 A.C. at 563. But see id. at 570-71 (concurring speech of Lord
Morton of Henryton). Modem cases have also suggested that some benefit to the defendant from the
failure to report is an element of the offense, see, eg., Regina v. Aberg, [1948] 1 All E.R. 601, 602,
and that one who is himself under investigation and fears self-incrimination cannot be prosecuted for
misprision. See, eg., Regina v. King, 49 Crim. App. 140, 145-46 (1965).
112. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 109, at 526; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 107, at 424;
Note, CriminalLaw-Common Law Offense of Misprisionof Felony Held Not Partof Modern Crimi-
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It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim every offense which comes to his knowledge; but the law which
would punish him
in every case, for not performing this duty, is too
113
harsh for man.

Professors LaFave and Scott report that only one siate court'has
affirmed the existence of the common law offense of misprision in recent
years. 114 The Model Penal Code, purporting to accord with the "vast
majority" of jurisdictions, "assign[s] no penalty to simple failure to in115
form authorities of criminal conduct."
Despite this pervasive disfavor, the United States Code has had a
general misprision of felony statute since the enactment of the first federal criminal statutes in 1790.116 It is a felony under the statute to "conceal[ ] and . ..not as soon as possible make known" to officials the
commission of a federal felony.1 17 Despite this straightforward language,
the statute has long been interpreted to require an affirmative act of concealment; courts have not penalized individuals for passive nondisclosure. 118 Under this limited interpretation, prosecutions have been
nal Law, 54 HARV. L. REv.506 (1941). A Canadian court has held that the common law offense
does not exist in that country. See Regina v. Semenick, 15 W.W.R. 333 (Br. Col. 1955).
113. Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556, 575-76 (1822).
114. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, supra note 109, at 526 n.65 (citing State v. Flynn, 100 R.I.
520, 217 A.2d 432 (1966)). Professors LaFave and Scott do not refer to a Washington statute that
makes it a misdemeanor (punishable by up to one year in prison and a $5000 fine) for one who has
witnessed the actual commission of or preparation for a felony involving violence or threat of violence to fail to make a report to the authorities. WASH REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.69.100, 9.92.020
(1977 & Supp. 1986). The limitation to actual eyewitnesses of violent crimes suggests that this statute, enacted in 1970, was intended to apply to the situation where witnesses stand idly by and ignore
a crime victim's cries for help. Its narrow focus prevents it from being a true exception to the
absence of a general duty to report.
Since the publication of the LaFave and Scott treatise, Ohio has reenacted a slightly modified
general misprision statute, the violation of which is a fourth degree misdemeanor punishable by a
maximum of thirty days imprisonment and a $250 fine. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2921.22(A),
2929.21(B)(4), 2929.21(C)(4) (Page 1982). Colorado has a curious penal code section imposing a
duty upon "every corporation or person who has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed to report promptly the suspected crime to law enforcement authorities." COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-8-115 (Supp. 1985). No penalty is assigned for breach of this duty.
There have been no reported successful prosecutions under any of these statutes; the only two
reported cases arising under any of them both resulted in appellate reversals. See Ohio v. Wardlow,
20 Ohio App. 3d 1, 4, 484 N.E.2d 276, 280 (1985); In re Stichtenoth, 67 Ohio App. 2d 108, 109-10,
425 N.E.2d 957, 958-59 (1980).
115. MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 commentary at 251 (1962).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1982) provides:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of
the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some
judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined
not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g.,
United States v. Davila, 698 F.2d 715, 717 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Hodges, 566 F.2d 674, 675 (9th Cir.
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It seems clear, then, that Straight and Pinstripe, in our hypotheticals, have no legally binding obligation to report to law enforcement au-

thorities the felonies of which they may have knowledge. It is safe to say
that a private citizen has no legal duty to report serious crimes, even

when that citizen is fully aware that a felony has been committed and
knows the identity of the wrongdoer.
Despite this absence of a general duty to report, numerous statutes

exist requiring individuals to report particular information. For exam-

120
ple, many jurisdictions require physicians to report gunshot wounds.

In recent times, physicians, mental health professionals, and school per2
sonnel have been required to report instances of suspected child abuse.' '
Courts have held that psychiatrists who learn that a patient has

threatened to injure another have a duty to contact that person and the
authorities and advise them of the potential danger. 122 Undertakers, hos-

pital administrators, and others are required to report deaths.123

Each of these miscellaneous reporting obligations reflects a particu-

larized judgment that society has a special need for the information involved. In each case, a departure from the ordinary rule is justified. Two

observations are in order. First, these situations generally involve information pertaining to grave misconduct. At a minimum, each involves a
danger of serious physical injury. Most of the situations addressed by the

statutes are literally matters of life and death. Second, these reporting
obligations apply only to particular classes of persons. In each case, the

obligation is imposed on individuals particularly well-situated to provide
necessary information that would be difficult to obtain from other
sources.
1977); United States v. Stuard, 566 F.2d 1, 1-2 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Pittman, 527 F.2d
444, 445 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119,
1124 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971); United States v. Sullivan, 411 F.2d 556, 558
(10th Cir. 1969); Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1939); Bratton v. United States,
73 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir. 1934); see also United States v. Farrar, 38 F.2d 515, 517 (D. Mass.)
(relying on state decisions involving misprision), aff'd, 281 U.S. 624 (1930).

119. 1 NATIONAL

COMMISSION ON REFORM

FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS

530 n.5 (1970).
120. See, eg., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(B) (Page 1982).
121. See, eg., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
122. See, eg., Tarasoffv. Board of Regents, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434-35, 551 P.2d 334, 343-44, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 26-27 (1976).
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit a lawyer to reveal client confidences under
circumstances analogous to those in Tarasoffi MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(b)(1) (1983) (disclosure appropriate to prevent a crime "likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm"). Cf MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3)
(1981) (allowing disclosure in order to prevent any crime on the part of a client).
123. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB: HEALTH LAW §§ 4140-4143 (McKinney 1985).
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In short, although lawyers have a duty to report to the appropriate
authorities the misconduct of other lawyers, the rule for society at large
is quite the contrary. There is no general duty to report criminal acts.
Where the law does impose a duty to report, that duty is circumscribed
with respect to both the class of persons upon which it is imposed and
the type of conduct to which it applies. Is this alternative system
justified?
B.

The Absence of a General Duty to Report: An Explanation.

One might think that it would be a good thing, all in all, if citizens
felt an obligation to report criminal activity. It does not necessarily follow, however, that society should penalize those who fail to fulfill such
an obligation; the difficulty and cost of enforcement might be thought to
outweigh the benefits of compulsory informing. Nonetheless, the notion
that citizens should feel an obligation to report information concerning
criminal activity has considerable appeal.
A strong argument can be made, however, that the absence of such
an obligation stems primarily from a pervasive distaste for informing in
general. The moral status of informing is sufficiently in doubt that a
broad legal requirement to inform simply would not be just. This analysis helps to explain why society imposes a duty to report only in situations of necessity.
To illustrate, let us return to our hypothetical cases and make all of
the participants business executives. It is highly probable that Straight
and Pinstripe would not bring the information they have learned to the
attention of the police. This should not be surprising. Of course, one
could explain their unwillingness to report in a number of ways without
necessarily disputing the existence of a generally felt moral duty to inform. Many felt moral obligations are not acted upon for self-interested
reasons. Fear of retaliation, unwillingness to withstand the inconvenience that attends involvement in legal proceedings, doubt regarding the
effectiveness of law enforcement officials-any of these factors may inhibit individuals from reporting known criminal activities. 124 But to focus on these factors is to miss the true basis of the prevailing attitude
toward informing. The hesitation to report on the part of our hypothetical characters is not merely the product of fear or laziness, with the result being the evasion of a moral duty. Rather, I assert that the ordinary
person in the position of either Pinstripe or Straight would feel no moral
124. Victimization surveys routinely uncover more crime than is reported to the police. See C.

(1978) (noting congruence of statistical studies indicating that victimizations far exceed reported crimes).

SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 450-51
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compulsion to report and indeed would find the idea of reporting to be
morally reprehensible.
The basis of this assertion may not be immediately apparent. Indeed, as noted above, the idea of an affirmative duty to report does have
certain appeal. Reporting furthers the social goals expressed in the criminal laws themselves. Enforcement of these laws would be impossible
without the cooperation of witnesses. It might be enough to require only
those individuals who have already been identified as witnesses to cooperate. Yet often the most difficult task for law enforcement officials is not
obtaining evidence for trial, but ferreting out crime in the first place. It is
precisely this sort of information that often only informers can provide.
But whatever the general importance of informer information, its
utility in any particular case can vary considerably, depending on the
nature of the crime in question and the nature and amount of other information available to the authorities. First, society's interest in the enforcement of criminal laws varies according to the particular social
policies at stake. For example, most people would agree that investigation and prosecution of homicides should be given priority over the enforcement of marijuana laws. By the same token, the damage caused
when citizens do not cooperate with enforcement authorities also varies.
Second, the need for informers varies from case to case, and from crime
to crime. Many of the most serious crimes leave physical traces that
provide at least some starting point for investigation. The classic contexts in which informers are necessary involve crimes that are either victimless or are so widely dispersed that the victims do not realize that they
have been victimized. Nonetheless, informer information is often essential, particularly in cases involving organized crime. Third, the amount
of criminal activity actually reported may be unaffected by a general
moral endorsement of informing. The informers involved in most criminal cases are typically not disinterested citizens responding to a sense of
moral duty. Instead, they are usually associates of the perpetrator who
have been offered cash payments or promises of leniency for their
cooperation.
In every case, however, we must presume that informing results in
some social benefit. Unless there exist important countervailing considerations, this consideration alone would be enough to justify making informing obligatory in all cases. But if there are moral costs to mandatory
informing, those costs must be weighed with sensitivity, not against a
general claim of necessity, but on a case-by-case basis against widely varying degrees of benefit.
I contend that such important countervailing considerations do in
fact exist. Several factors shape our perceptions about informing. Three
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of the most important factors are the connection between the potential
witness and the crime, the relationship between the witness and the perpetrator, and the seriousness of the crime.
1. The Special Case of Victims. One reason we do not typically
think of the victim as being under an obligation to inform is that the
victim usually has an obvious incentive to report. Natural desires for
retribution or compensation lead directly to an impulse to seek out and
cooperate with those who might be of aid in realizing those desires. In
fact, however, many victims do not report crimes to the police. So-called
"victimization studies," which survey random samples of people, routinely yield much higher crime figures than do police statistics. 125 Any
number of reasons may account for the failure of many victims to report.
Many may feel that the police can do little to help them. Others may feel
that the costs and inconvenience of becoming involved with the police
are too high. Still others may fear retaliation. Fear of public humiliation
may be a factor in some cases. 126 Finally, some people may be simply
unable to report because of complex psychological factors.1 2 7 Whatever
the reason, the point is that the desire for retribution will not always
induce the victim to report. If it is desired that all crimes be prosecuted,
additional incentives may be necessary.
Historically, such incentives have been provided. With regard to
the crime of misprision, for example, no distinction was made between
victims and nonvictims; anyone who failed to report information concerning a felony was subject to prosecution. 12 In addition, the threat of
prosecution under the common law crime of compounding discouraged
arrangements whereby the victim would forgo reporting the crime in exchange for a private settlement. Originally applicable only to crimes involving theft, compounding came to apply to any situation in which one
agreed to show favor to a felon in exchange for a material benefit.129 The
law made no exception for victims; indeed, the fact that the offense
125. Id. at 451.
126. This point applies not only to rape victims, but also to fraud victims who may be embarrassed about their greed or gullibility.
127. See McLeod, Victim Noncooperation in the Prosecution of Domestic Assault, 21 CRIMINOLoGY 395, 400 (1983) (noting that psychological factors may account for victim noncooperation in
domestic violence cases).
128. The noted Australian case, Regina v. Crimmins, 1959 V.R. 270, is a good example. Crimmins was shot and wounded in a gun battle. Although he evidently knew the identity of his assailant, he refused to tell the police, perhaps because he preferred private vindication. The Victoria
Supreme Court sustained his conviction for misprision. Id. at 272-74.
129. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 109, at 526-27; Howard, supra note 107, at 757-58.
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originated in the concept of theftbote suggests that the crime was at one
130
time specifically applicable to victims.
Modem thinking, however, grants a victim far more control over
the decision to prosecute. The application of compounding statutes to
victims is typically limited. 13 1 Moreover, victims have considerable practical influence over the decision to institute prosecution in many types of
cases. Although it is true that the state is the prosecuting party and can
institute prosecution even over the objection of the victim, few prosecutions proceed where cooperation from the victim is not forthcoming.
Often the victim is the only witness, or at least the only one known to
police in the early stages of an investigation. Without the victim's testimony, there is nothing on which to base a complaint. Even if the victim
cooperates in the early stages and the police develop a viable case, prosecutors generally feel that lack of enthusiasm on the part of a victim-witness at trial thwarts a successful prosecution.
These practical considerations, however, do not fully account for the
control that victims often exert over the conduct of criminal prosecutions. We generally regard it as an appropriate exercise of prosecutorial
discretion when a prosecutor takes the victim's attitude into account.
The victim's attitude toward the crime is seen as an appropriate factor in
assessing its seriousness and, indeed, may be the critical factor in the
decision whether or not to prosecute if the crime is otherwise at the margin of social attention.
It is appropriate that the victim's attitude should influence the decision whether or not to prosecute. Although any crime in some sense
injures the entire state, such injury is obviously abstract compared to the
130. Theftbote, a felony, was committed when a thief and his victim entered into an agreement
that the stolen property would be returned "in exchange for an undertaking not to cooperate in

prosecution."

MODEL PENAL CODE §

242.5 commentary at 244 (1980). See also id. at 251 ("Tradi-

tionally, the law of compounding has been thought to have its distinctive impact on the victims of

crime.").
131. The Model Penal Code's treatment of compounding reflects modem attitudes regarding the
victim's duty to report. The drafters of the Model Penal Code thought that "[t]he central issue in
the law of compounding is whether to except from liability the victim of a crime who agrees to drop
criminal charges if the alleged offender makes restitution for the harm caused." MODEL PENAL
CODE

§ 242.5 commentary at 249 (1980). The drafters' solution was to exempt victims who refrain

from informing in exchange for a benefit only if the benefit does "not exceed an amount which the

actor believe[s] to be due as restitution or indemnification for harm caused by the offense." Id.
§ 242.5.

This exception seems inconsistent with the policy underlying the law of compounding. This
policy, like the policy underlying misprision, is to bring as many crimes as possible to the attention
of the authorities. Mandatory reporting by victims as well as by others clearly furthers this goal.
Moreover, few would deny that it is socially undesirable to allow the prospect of personal material
gain to influence the decision to report criminal activity.
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injury borne by the victim. 13 2 It is therefore entirely reasonable that the
system's response should be influenced by the victim's desire to pursue
justice.
Even these considerations, however, do not establish a firm basis for
exempting victims from any obligation to report crimes. At most, they
establish that prosecutorial deference to the victim's wishes may be appropriate in certain situations. The state, not the victim, appropriately
controls the decision to waive prosecution. That control is a significant
practical factor in many prosecutions. Serious crimes involving corruption, fraud, or violence are frequently investigated and prosecuted without victim cooperation. Courts may even compel reluctant victims to
testify. Even when the prosecutor gives controlling weight to a victim's
wishes in a particular case, the state still makes the ultimate decision.
Thus, the victim who fails to report the crime in effect arrogates
prosecutorial discretion to himself.
Nevertheless, we are reluctant to require victims to report crimes.
In part, this reluctance stems from sympathy for their suffering. A crime
victim has suffered a deprivation of rights that society has an interest in
protecting. That interest is attenuated, though, if the victim chooses not
to cooperate in a prosecution. Therefore, it seems unduly harsh to impose on victims a further obligation-an obligation that may well entail
substantial financial and emotional costs beyond those already suffered 1 33-without carefully evaluating the specific social need to do so.
Ultimately, however, the reluctance to require victims to report
crimes is rooted in respect for human autonomy. The victim of a crime
has not, after all, deliberately chosen to perform any act that carries with
it the expectation of special duties or burdens. By definition victims are
people whose rights have been violated in a grievous way. How an individual responds to such a violation is an intensely personal matter. A
victim may, out of moral conviction or legitimate self-interest, prefer to
deal with the offender by some appropriate means other than official punishment. Forgiveness, private settlement, or civil redress may well be the
preferred response for many victims, especially in cases involving ongo132. Minor offenses against persons and property may represent little significant harm beyond
that suffered by the victim, particularly when the persons involved have a continuing relationship of
some kind. In such cases, giving weight to the victim's preferences is especially appropriate. In
some instances, of course, a victim's unwillingness to cooperate in prosecution might reflect a preference for private vindication rather than a lack of desire for any vindication at all. See supra note
128. A person's reluctance to prosecute may also stem from psychological vulnerability. See supra
note 127. In such cases the victim's desire to forgo prosecution would not necessarily merit
deference.
133. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
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ing personal or commercial relationships. 134 An employer who chooses
to accept repayment from an embezzling employee, and give him another

chance, would generally be perceived as acting nobly rather than
wrongly.
Of course, few would question the victim's right to report a

crime. 135 Although such reporting in effect inflicts harm on the criminal,
that harm is justified under most moral systems because the criminal has
forfeited his right not to be punished and society as a whole is better off
by imposing punishment. 136 Indeed, society should do whatever it can to
minimize the inconvenience and indignity to which crime victims are

subjected, and to protect them from retaliation should they decide to
137

report the crime.
But I would deny the existence of any moral duty on the part of
victims to seek punishment of the guilty. 138 The likelihood that the com134. Of course, the reason for noncooperation must be socially acceptable. Preference for private retaliation cannot be a permissible reason to forgo legal remedies. Receipt of financial benefits
beyond reasonable compensation for harm appropriates payment due to society rather than to the
victim, and is thus appropriately treated as blackmail. See Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of
Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 670 (1984).
135. One might argue that even a crime victim should not report information that would lead to
a person's conviction under a legal system that was totally unjust, or that imposed grossly disproportionate punishment for the crime in question. One might also argue, at least from a consequentialist
perspective, that there are situations where the harm to others that would result from reporting a
crime would far outweigh the harm of allowing the crime to go unpunished. Some of these situations
(e.g., a kidnapper threatens to harm a child if the kidnapping is reported) raise questions of duress or
necessity, defenses that would be available even if a general obligation to report were imposed.
136. Children sometimes appear to disapprove reporting of offenses to the authorities even by
victims. This disapproval does not stem from any feeling that it is wrong to seek the punishment of
wrongdoers. Rather, it is based on the admiration children feel for the victim's direct retaliation.
Adult society rightly seeks to repress this sentiment and to encourage resort to socially-mediated
forms of punishment. But there may be a more sophisticated rationale for children's disapproval of
"tattlers." At least where the violation is not serious enough to outweigh such concerns, the social
bonds among children, and their lack of understanding of (and hence dissent from) adult notions of
justice may present reasons for refusing to inform similar to those prevailing in an unjust society. In
an occupied country, for example, there may be considerable popular feeling that disputes should be
settled "among ourselves," rather than referred to authorities not perceived as legitimate.
137. For some modest steps in this direction, see the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982,
18 U.S.C. § 1512 (Supp. 11 1984); and the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1061 (Supp. 11 1984).
138. It might be argued that a victim of a particularly heinous crime such as rape owes a moral
duty to society to report the crime and cooperate in prosecution so as to help ensure that others do
not suffer the same fate. This argument suggests that the social benefit of reporting under such
circumstances outweighs the imposition on the victim's interests and autonomy. I would not accept
this argument. The social benefits are too contingent to outweigh the concrete anguish the victim
stands to suffer. Of course, it might be that the victim does better to sacrifice her interests to achieve
a benefit for others. Our society, however, as a rule does not impose legal duties of this kind. If
society is unwilling to impose a legal duty on a bystander to intervene at no risk to himself to rescue
a stranger, it is difficult to see how society could require acts that would, at some cost to the crime
victim, effect so uncertain a rescue of unidentifiable potential future victims. But see Weinrib, The
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munity will be unable to eliminate entirely the suffering and risk entailed
by a crime victim's choice to report, and the possibility that a victim may
choose for moral reasons not to seek punishment, at least make it appropriate as a general matter to respect the victim's decision not to report.
Existing law appropriately accommodates the victim's interest in
personal autonomy with the state's interest in retaining ultimate control
over the conduct of criminal prosecutions. The state retains the power to
initiate an investigation and pursue a prosecution without a victim's complaint. When necessary, it may compel the victim to testify. But the
state does not require the victim to make an unsolicited initial report of
the crime. A victim's liberty to select a reasonable response to the experience of victimization is only disregarded after a focused judgment determining that in particular cases society's need for the victim's
cooperation outweighs the burden on the victim that such cooperation
entails. The limited social utility of mandatory reporting by reluctant
victims does not outweigh the moral autonomy of and practical costs to
the victim. Thus, the decision to impose no duty to report upon victims
appears to be morally as well as pragmatically correct.
2. Nonvictim Witnesses. Society's reluctance to impose additional
burdens on victims does not explain the absence of an informing obligation applicable to nonvictims. The moral questions surrounding the
problem of informing reach their greatest intensity when the potential
informer is not the victim, but a third party witness. This is the situation
that brings to mind the unsavory image of the informer as a betrayer of
confidence. The vividness of the image evoked depends upon two factors: the witness's relationship to the perpetrator and the gravity of the
offense.
a. The relationship to the offender. Obviously, the relationship
between the wrongdoer and the witness is a key factor in our assessment
of the morality of informing. The very term "informer" evokes a sense of
betrayal. Victor Navasky defines an informer "inaccordance with...
popular usage ...as someone who betrays a comrade, i.e., a fellow member of a movement, a colleague, or a friend, to the authorities."' 139 Thus,
the person who calls the police to report a fight in the street between two
strangers is probably not thought of by most people as an informer.
Three kinds of bonds between people would seem to alter this license to report. The first is the bond established when one makes a
Casefor a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 268-92 (1980) (arguing that a general duty to rescue
can be justified within the ethical traditions that inform the common law system).
139. V. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES XViii (1980).
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promise to another. Ordinarily, we regard the keeping of promises as a
moral duty. Someone who has explicitly promised not to reveal the contents of a communication will ordinarily feel bound to respect that prom-

ise. For example, suppose Cool had approached his friend Straight,
elicited a promise of confidentiality, and then revealed that he had used
drugs and was worried about his impending interview before the Charac-

ter Committee. Given these circumstances, most people would think it
improper were Straight to reveal Cool's misdeeds. At best, the situation
would be regarded as involving a conflict of duties. 140 The same situation
can arise even where no express promise has been made. Depending on

the conversation's context, for example, one might find an implied promise of confidentiality in the conversation between Pinstripe and
Mouthpiece.
The second bond is what might be called affinity. In certain situa-

tions, this bond stems from an implied promise. For example, when a
person reports a fellow member of a movement, that person's action may
be perceived as a breach of an implied promise mutually exchanged by all

those involved in the movement. Relationships involving affinity, however, do not always involve implied promises. Family relationships, for

example, create a certain loyalty regardless of the existence of any express or implied agreement to maintain confidentiality. Ethnic loyalties
constitute an extended version of this sort of involuntary identification
with others. Friendship, while in part the product of implicit promises,

may be seen as a choice to incorporate the friend into a family-like affinity group.
Perhaps this type of bond is best viewed as an extension of one's
primal loyalty to oneself. This loyalty is derivative of the drive for self-

140. The degree of conflict would depend on the circumstances. For example, if Straight had
made the promise before Cool confided in him, Straight might feel that Cool had deceived him into
making a promise without full awareness of the consequences and might, therefore, find the promise
less binding. Some would argue that one should never honor a promise to do wrong. Whether or
not one agrees with this generalization, in a complex case it seems to beg the question. The existence
of the promise may be one of many factors relevant to determining whether a particular act is right
or wrong. Obviously, the benefits that result from breaking the promise are relevant as well. For
example, an explicit promise of confidentiality should be broken if necessary to prevent a murder.
For different assessments of the seriousness of the harm necessary to justify breaking one kind of
pledge of confidentiality, compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(l)
(1983) (intended criminal act must threaten imminent death or serious bodily harm) with MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1981) (any intended criminal act is sufficiently serious). These and other variations need not be explored in detail here. For my purposes, it
is sufficient to note that a promise creates a bond between people that further complicates the moral
ambiguity of informing.
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preservation. 141 But every individual is situated within-some would say
constituted by-a tangle of relationships with others. 142 To the extent
that others are within this zone of self-identification, they partake of the
same loyalty. In circles radiating outward from the individual, then,
there are bonds of varying strength within which it seems wrong to do
143
harm, even for the greater good of society.
Informing is also viewed as morally wrong in the context of relationships founded on certain social roles. A lawyer's general duty to preserve
the secrets of a client exists not because of an interpersonal bond of affinity, or because of some kind of implied or express promise, but rather
because society deems the attorney-client confidential relationship to be
essential to the proper functioning of the adversarial system.144 This type
of relationship is less interesting from a moral perspective than the other
types of relationships discussed above because it is based so obviously on
14 5
identifiable social goals.
Because society values such relationships, it strives to protect them
through means such as evidentiary privileges. 146 The reasoning behind
these privileges provides guidance in determining the appropriate scope
of the obligation to report. For even where the societal need for information is great, the law has determined that the social benefits of preserving
some relationships outweigh the need for information. Since evidentiary
privileges permit one to refuse to answer questions in proceedings in
which compulsory process is available, it follows that the less immediate
141. For a particularly thoughtful discussion of one's right not to inform against oneself, see
Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 28-32

(1981).
142. See M. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 7-14 (Oct. 10, 1983)
(unpublished paper delivered at Columbia Law School Legal Theory Workshop).
143. The moral legitimacy of such special regard for others is discussed in C. FRIED, THE
ANATOMY OF VALUES 207-36 (1970). See also M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179-83 (1982); Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client

Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1066-71 (1976).

144. See United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (discussing purpose of attorney-client
privilege).
145. One might derive the first two types of relationships from some deontological ethical premise, and dismiss the third type as a mere matter of social policy-a morally neutral "positional
duty." See A. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 21 (1979). Alternatively, one might derive all three types from purely consequentialist premises, and identify all three
as special examples of a general duty to maximize social benefits. One can find the three types to be
morally relevant under either view. The first two bonds are more interesting, however, because they
require us to inquire more deeply into basic human needs. Only the first twio types of bonds are
sufficient to imply a right not to do what is most socially beneficial or, in utilitarian terms, a deeper
reason not to do what seems on the surface most beneficial.
501[01]-513[03]
146. See generally 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE

(1985) (outlining the communications privileged under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
and the Supreme Court's Draft Rules 502-513).
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obligation to report misconduct should be inapplicable to these kinds of

relationships.
But these privileges are exceedingly narrowly drawn. Only a few

relationships of extraordinary importance are protected at

all, 147

and in

most of these cases, the evidentiary privilege applies only to certain sorts
of communications.

Nevertheless, the reasoning behind these privileges provides some
guidance in understanding the limitations of a duty to report. A person

will not be required to testify against his or her spouse because that exemption "foster[s] the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relation-

ship," 148 and also because of "the natural repugnance in every fairminded person to compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the
other's condemnation."' 149 The relationship is protected both because of

its social benefit and because it is intrinsically valuable to the parties involved. To impose on such a fundamental relationship would be to violate human dignity.
Other kinds of relationships are neither as fundamental to the sort of
society we desire, nor as essential to individual dignity, as the marital
relationship. 50 Such relationships are nevertheless of enormous value,
both to society and to the individual. Family relationships, professional
associations, religious affiliations, friendships, and even the vague ties of
acquaintance and fellowship that bind neighbors or people from the same
hometown are all relations essential to both social and individual wellbeing. The state should encourage rather than disrupt these relations to
the extent consistent with other social needs.' 51
147. For example, courts have not found the parent-child relationship to be of sufficient social
importance to warrant the protection of an evidentiary privilege. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Santarelli), 740 F.2d 816, 817 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. (Under Seal), 714 F.2d 347,
349 n.4 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom. Doe v. United States, 464 U.S. 978 (1983); In re Grand

Jury Proceedings (Starr), 647 F.2d 511, 512-13 (5th Cir. 1981). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Agosto), 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev. 1983) ("[TIhe confidence and privacy inherent in
the parent-child relationship must be protected and sedulously fostered by the courts.").
148. United States v. Trammell, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
149. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2228, at 217 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961).
150. I would include within the term "marital relationship" a range of equivalent relations
outside the formal institution of marriage. See Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences
of Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631.
151. Even the bond that unites criminals joined in a common venture has moral value as an
expression of human solidarity. Hence, some have ambivalent feelings about criminals who become
government witnesses against their former comrades. The "stand-up guy" may be a crook, but at
least he possesses a certain sense of honor; the "stoolie" only compounds his wrongdoing by his act
of betrayal. In this situation, however, the danger posed-criminals can increase the scope and
efficiency of their activities by banding together-may well outweigh any benefit that results from
the relationship. Moreover, in most such instances, factors such as the seriousness of the offenses
involved and the need to rejoin the larger society tip the balance in favor of informing. For an
interesting meditation on informing as an inevitable consequence of a shift in loyalties, see
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These relationships also serve another important function: they provide a buffer between the individual and society at large. Such buffers are
essential to the preservation of pluralistic society. Indeed, a person's
very identity is in large part defined by the networks of communities and
connections to which he belongs. 152 At the same time, they infuse an
otherwise abstract loyalty to the larger society with concrete contentone who goes to war to defend his country probably draws more strength
from the image of his family and friends than from that of the flag or the
Constitution. But such relationships, founded on trust, are impossible in
a society of informers.
The value of such relationships, however, does not make informing
always a moral wrong. The impulse to protect one's friends and associates from harm-even from deserved punishment-is a moral and socially useful impulse precisely because it reaches beyond individual selfinterest; it assimilates another's well-being to that of oneself. But this
impulse can take on a selfish character if it is felt only with respect to a
narrowly defined group. The altruistic bonding process that gives moral
weight to particular relationships may then ironically produce group
alienation and hostility. Recognition of the interests of members of even
broader communities may represent a still more mature expression of the
same search for bonds beyond the self. Thus, abstract interests such as
"social good" and "justice" will in some instances take precedence over
loyalty to a friend, so that informing can become a moral duty. The
moral content of the narrower loyalties is never fully dissipated, however,
and it is for this reason that society is deeply ambivalent toward
reporting.
The moral conflict thus presented is, essentially, the one suggested
by E.M. Forster's famous aphorism placing loyalty to friends over loyalty to country.1 53 Forster's absolutism is clearly mistaken. The desire
to prevent harm to large numbers of innocent but unidentified people will
sometimes override narrower bonds of loyalty and emotional identification. Yet it surely goes too far to urge, as some utilitarians might, that
W. CHAMBERS, WITNESs 453-56 (1952). In any case, with respect to a legal obligation to inform,
the question is essentially academic. There is little point in adding to the liability of accomplices and
coconspirators an additional liability for failing to report the crimes in which they were involved.
Cf Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968) (fifth amendment forbids government to
compel person to register illegal activities for tax purposes); Regina v. King, 49 Crim. App. 140, 14546 (1965) (alleged conspirator not required to report crime of coconspirator if to do so would tend to
incriminate himself).
152. M. SANDEL, supra note 143, at 150.
153. See E. FORSTER, Two CHEERS FOR DEMOCRACY 68 (1951) ("[I]f I had to choose between
betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my
country.").
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we ought to treat all persons as moral equivalents.1 54 For example, it is
not clear that it is morally wrong to devote resources to the education of
one's child rather than to the nourishment of famine victims on the other

side of the world. 155 If Forster's particularism is far too absolute, there is
also "no obvious reason why 'more general social concerns' as such
should in all cases defeat more local or particular concerns merely in

virtue of their generality."

156

Loyalties to units smaller than humanity at

large or the nation-state serve psychic needs and social purposes that are

important enough to justify the subordination of larger loyalties under
certain circumstances. 1 57 Loyalty to friends and loyalty to country are

too closely connected for the choice between them to be anything but
tragic.
b.

The gravity of the offense.

Society's misgivings about the pro-

priety of informing vary with the gravity of the offense in question. At

one extreme, informers are subject to criticism if the information they
provide concerns activities not generally perceived as harmful to society.
Thus, commentators have severely criticized those who "named names"

before the legislative committees investigating Communist activities in
the early 1950's, despite the fact that this information was given in response to government questioning conducted under considerable pressure, including compulsory legal process.158 Although the case against

these witnesses is based in part on the presumption against reporting the
activities of close friends or political associates, it depends crucially on

the claim that the threat of Communist infiltration was overblown by
unscrupulous politicians and in fact posed no real danger to American
society. 159
At the other extreme, few would doubt that the public duty to prevent widespread harm at some point overrides even the strongest inter154. Commentators on legal ethics are sometimes remarkably superficial on this point. Thus,
one article criticized Charles Fried's thesis that the lawyer's special relationship to the client has
moral weight justifying actions that would not be permissible absent that special relationship, see C.
FRIED, supra note 143, at 134, and argued that a defining characteristic of relationships such as
"family, friend or nation" is their "amorality." D'Amato & Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27
ST.Louis U.L.J. 761, 766 (1983). But that is plainly wrong. Such relationships do not, as D'Amato
and Eberle would have it, transcend moral considerations; they are instead an important factor in
moral calculations.
155. See C. FRIED, supra note 143, at 1066.
156. M. SANDEL, supra note 143, at 146.
157. See id. at 62-63, 147-52, 179-83.
158. For a presentation of the case against informing in this context, see V. NAVAsKY, supra
note 139.
159. Thus, Navasky argues that the investigating bodies in this instance "had been careless with
individual rights and reputations and... had [not] demonstrated a seriousness of public purpose."
Id. at xiii.
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personal loyalties. Could one seriously doubt the propriety of a former
Communist reporting an actual plot by Communists within the military
to stage a coup d'etat? Or, looked at from the opposite political point of
view, would not a member of a revolutionary cell be justified in informing his superiors of actions taken by a comrade that endangered the
movement?160 Under any consequentialist moral system, the harm that
the informer seeks to prevent must be weighed against the wrong that
will result from the betrayal of friends or associates. Likewise, any system that considers particular relationships or associations to be sacred
must recognize that certain conditions must exist and certain principles

must be preserved if such relationships are to develop and flourish.
Surely conduct that violates the very principles on which a particular

harm in a global sense than does the act
association is based causes more
6

1
of reporting that conduct. '
It seems clear then that the moral status of informing is determined
by both the strength of the interpersonal loyalties involved and the gravity of the harm the informer seeks to prevent. Many would feel that it
would be wrong for Straight to report the wrongdoing of his associate
Cool. This conclusion would not necessarily represent a denigration of

the seriousness of the misconduct involved-though it would obviously
follow more easily for one who regarded recreational use of drugs as only
a minor character flaw. Even some who feel strongly that the conduct in

question is morally reprehensible may nevertheless pause before they
conclude that Straight should alert the authorities. These people may

conclude that the social benefit of requiring Straight to inform is outweighed by society's interest in the bonds created by membership in their

respective professional circles.
160. The need felt in some circles to denounce informers points up the moral ambivalence of
informing. One commentator claims that Jewish law treats informing as a vile act and that the
person who informs against the life or property of another Jew to non-Jews may be liable to gruesome punishments ranging up to execution. Id. at xii. This commentator then goes on to point out,
without visible irony, that "Jewish law requires reporting the informer to the Jewish legal authorities." Id. The purported rule requiring Jews to report informers reminds us once again that the
question of informing involves a conflict among various bonds of loyalty. Personal loyalty to a
friend may be at odds with loyalty to the group, which in turn may be at odds with legal demands for
loyalty to a larger political entity. As Michael Sandel has stated:
Each of us moves in an indefinite number of communities, some more inclusive than
others, each making different claims on our allegiance, and there is no saying in advance
which is the society or community whose purpose should govern the disposition of any
particular set of our attributes and endowments.
M. SANDEL, supra note 143, at 146.
161. Cf C. FRIED, supra note 143, at 1083 ("If personal integrity lies at the foundation of the
lawyer's right to treat his client as a friend, then surely consideration for personal integrity-his own
and others'-must limit what he can do in friendship.").
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It is not clear, however, just how serious the misconduct would have
to be before the balance shifted. Even one who thought that Pinstripe
should not report Mouthpiece's tax evasion would probably feel differently if Mouthpiece had admitted he had embezzled a large sum of
money. Neither is it clear just how much the balance is affected by the
precise relationship in question. For example, were Mouthpiece and Pinstripe brother and sister rather than professional colleagues, wouldn't
misconduct of an even more serious nature be required before the balance
shifted in favor of informing?
This article makes no attempt to resolve these questions. Whether
one should report a friend or associate is a complex question the answer
to which will depend upon not only the closeness of the relationship and
the seriousness of the wrongdoing, but also upon a wide variety of other
considerations.1 62 The only point sought to be made here is that in some
situations, under some moral systems, suppressing information detrimental to interpersonal relationships will be the correct moral course of
action.
It seems unquestionable that the general disapproval of informers
has a moral basis and that the law has correctly refused to impose an
obligation to inform. If there is no social consensus about the circumstances in which informing is morally acceptable, and if any consensus
that could develop would likely involve a multiplicity of imprecise factors not easily susceptible to objective proof, it would be a mistake for
society to impose a generalized legal obligation to report all misconduct.
The law, a somewhat blunt moral instrument in any event, is particularly ill-suited to deal sensitively with the kind of moral issues presented
in this area. After all, the very conflict in question is between allegiance
to interpersonal loyalties and allegiance to the goals of society as a whole.
Because the law in a sense represents one side of this conflict-society as
a whole-it cannot easily accommodate all the interests at stake.
In considering ways in which an accommodation can be effected, the
162. For example, one may wish to consider the possibility that reporting will prevent harm,
result in victim compensation, and serve necessary social goals through punishment.
Under a consequentialist moral theory, the approach may be characterized as balancing the
long-term social advantages of protecting the relationship in question against the immediate advantages of detecting and punishing the wrongdoer. A truly refined calculation would consider not only
the seriousness of the offense, but also how valuable the information would actually be in securing a
conviction, and what benefit would accrue from imposing punishment. But because precise quantification of these factors will often not be possible, the gravity of the offense will in most cases be the
primary consideration.
For those who view the issue as one involving a duty arising from a relationship of trust, the
gravity of the offense is directly relevant to the extent to which the informing party has forfeited a
right to claim the benefit of that relationship.
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law of privileges provides a useful analogy. As noted above, 163 the law
does not recognize evidentiary privileges that turn on an ad hoc balancing. Instead, it exempts only a few types of relationships, despite the
likelihood that in certain cases a balancing of harms would not favor
such an exemption. The limited scope of the law of privileges results in
large part from a realization that an ad hoc approach would involve consideration of factors that are not susceptible to objective proof. By limiting the scope of evidentiary privileges, society has expessed a judgment
that the need for testimony is great enough to outweigh all but the most
vital personal relationships.
Similar considerations counsel against the imposition of a generalized duty to inform. Although it would sometimes be morally correct to
report wrongdoing that comes to one's attention, such action would be
morally incorrect in a great number of situations. The considerations
relivant to sorting out these cases are highly complex. The preference
for laws that are narrowly drawn and easy to apply would thus counsel
that the law leave individuals free to follow their consciences in deciding
whether or not to inform, except in a few carefully defined situations.
Moreover, given the likelihood that people would disregard an unfocused
and unpopular obligation to report the misconduct of others, little social
benefit can be expected from a general rule, even in those instances in
which the moral obligation to inform is clearest. Whatever the reasons,
the law has generally declined-correctly I believe-to impose a duty to
provide unsolicited information, except in situations in which the information is especially vital and a definable category of persons is particularly likely to obtain it.164 The possibility of harm is too great, and the
rewards too slim, to justify a general duty to inform.
III.

LAWYERS:

A

SPECIAL CASE?

The ethical codes applicable to lawyers ought to reflect the same
approach that has proven acceptable to society as a whole. The tension
in the ABA's codes of professional conduct stems from the combination
of a desire to profess a high-minded duty to society and a practical recognition of the difficulties of enforcing such a broad obligation. The result
in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility has been a broad but
ambiguous endorsement of informing that has, as the drafters of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct correctly noted, "proved to be unenforceable." 1 65 Although the Model Rules have moved in the right di163. See supra note 147.
164. See supra notes 106-23 and accompanying text.
165. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 comment (1983). As commentators
have noted, "enforcement [of the present rule on informing] is virtually non-existent. The research
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rection by limiting the obligation to inform to situations in which the
violation is serious, they have not carefully defined the categories of information subject to the mandatory reporting obligation. Instead, the
Model Rules create an obligation that imports into the old rule yet an1 66
other ambiguous exercise of judgment.
Before attempting to refine the rule further, an obvious question
should be addressed. Aren't lawyers different? Should society subject
lawyers to special rules because of their special status in society?
A.

Are Lawyers Different?

The moral and legal standards applicable to lawyers may be distinguished from those that apply to the general population by noting that
lawyers have a special role in the legal system. Because of this special
role, one might argue, their obligations to the rule of law are greater than
those of ordinary people and they accordingly should be required to give
greater weight to certain social considerations.
Claims that special standards should apply to lawyers because of
their unique role in society are sometimes more rhetorical than analytical. Occasionally, such claims seem more calculated to buttress the elite
social position of lawyers than to impose additional responsibilities upon
them.1 67 The high standards pledged by the profession often lack concrete, enforceable substance. In assessing any claim that lawyers automatically should adopt a higher obligation to inform, it is necessary to
examine the actual conduct that lies behind the rhetoric of adherence to
strict behavioral standards.
The ABA's frank recognition that the Code's broad reporting requirement has "proved to be unenforceable" 168 suggests that in balancing
intraprofessional loyalty against even an explicit command to inform,
lawyers have acted no differently than other citizens. Lawyers have generally determined that awareness of another lawyer's wrongdoing does
not automatically impose a moral duty to inform.
It is difficult to see why the sort of complex moral balancing disnotes accompanying the Proposed Final Draft [of the Model Rules] reveal only one reported case
involving violation of the duty to report, and in that instance the lawyer who failed to report another's misconduct was himself involved in the misconduct." G. HAZARD & W. HoDEs, supra note
4, at 556.
166. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 8.3 comment (1983) ("A measure of
judgment is ... required in complying with the provisions of this Rule."); see also supra notes 85100.
167. See Morgan, The Evolving Concept of ProfessionalResponsibility, 90 HARV. L. REv. 702,
706 (1977) (current ethical rules place interests of lawyers before those of the client and the public).
168. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 comment (1983).
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cussed above 169 should be different with respect to lawyers. Suppose, for
example, that in the hypothetical involving the tax evasion disclosure,
Pinstripe had been an accountant rather than a lawyer. Would this affect
either the social benefit that would result from bringing Mouthpiece to
justice or the moral character of the personal and professional relationship between Pinstripe and Mouthpiece? The assertion that lawyers are
special and should abide by higher moral standards turns out to have
little content as a moral argument. 170
Even if one assumes that the legal system's claims have special gravity with respect to lawyers, the argument against a generalized obligation
to inform remains essentially unaffected. After all, that argument is not
based on a claim that informing is usually a morally incorrect choice;
there are situations in which all would agree that a witness is obligated to
inform. Rather, the argument is based on the proposition that the moral
calculation is so complex that reasonable people will disagree about the
proper outcome in a wide range of cases. It is difficult to imagine that
the special circumstances of the lawyer's position in society alter the balance in every case to the point that the complexity of the moral calculation disappears. In other words, it is not clear, even for lawyers, that the
moral basis of informing will be so clear in so many cases that a generalized obligation to inform should be imposed.
The case for a special obligation can be made in a more concrete
fashion. It could be argued that lawyers should have a special duty to
report the misconduct of other lawyers not because of an abstract obligation to the law, but because of a particular facet of their position in society. Because lawyers are members of a self-governing, self-policing
profession, one could argue that a reporting obligation would serve a special need of the bar.' 7 1
Yet a logical connection between self-regulation and a duty to inform is not immediately apparent. After all, our society is itself selfregulating in the sense that its members are ultimately responsible for the
laws that govern conduct. And yet it does not follow from this that there
should be a legally enforceable duty to report violations of those laws.
But lawyers, it might be noted, are also self-policing: if they do not take
the lead in uncovering the misconduct of other lawyers, no one else will.
Once again, however, it is not clear how to distinguish ordinary civil
169. See supra notes 105-64 and accompanying text.
170. See Abel, Why Does the ABA PromulgateEthicalRules?, 59 TEX. L. REv. 639, 668 (1981)
(arguing that purpose of Model Rules is "to create a myth about what lawyers might be in order to
disguise what they are").
171. See Gentile, supra note 8, at 2, col. 2 ("The reporting requirement is nothing less than
essential to the survival of the profession .... ").
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society. In a democratic society, the actors charged with policing conduct are not members of an outside force, but members of the population
who have the special task of enforcing the norms agreed upon by all.
Society is thus self-policing, but with specialists performing the police
function. The legal profession also has its own disciplinary apparatus
responsible for investigating and punishing violations of the rules of professional conduct. If these organs of discipline inadequately control lawyers, the bar should certainly act to strengthen them. But the
disappointing experience of mandatory informing hardly suggests that
such a rule has been or can be the answer to inadequate self-policing.172
The rhetorical invocation of the "self-regulating, self-policing" notion is more of a public relations gimmick than anything else. As one
advocate of the reporting obligation candidly puts it:
We have long been a self-policing, self-regulating profession. That we
have retained control of the admission, scrutiny, and discipline of our
own members is a measure of the trust and esteem accorded lawyers
today, public grumbling to the contrary notwithstanding. That trust,
ever fragile, rests upon our assurance that lawyers who continue in
good standing at the Bar are trustworthy and honest and that, if they
are not, the 173
profession's disciplinary arm will deal with them
appropriately.
Under this view, the duty-to-report rhetoric is aimed as much at persuading the public to let the bar remain a self-policing entity as it is at encouraging the bar to effectively police itself.
The motives underlying such rhetoric are not likely to inspire compliance with a distasteful obligation. Protecting the bar's monopoly over
the admission and discipline of lawyers is a worthwhile goal only to the
extent that it generates improved legal services. Both the reality and the
appearance of improved lawyer discipline would be better served by increasing the resources available to disciplinary bodies. Increased informing by lawyers surely is not the answer.
B. Applying Lessons from the Outside World.
If lessons from the outside world apply to the legal profession, it
follows that the proper approach is to impose upon lawyers no generalized duty to report. Such a duty conforms neither to the average person's moral intuitions nor to realistic expectations. Accordingly, lawyers
are unlikely to comply with a broad informing requirement. Thus, the
Model Rules correctly move away from the Code's broad formulation to
172. Once again, the experience of general law enforcement seems relevant. No one urges the
imposition of an obligation to inform on private citizens as a substitute for more and better-trained
police and prosecutors.
173. Gentile, supra note 8, at 2, col. 3.
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a more circumscribed one. By limiting the informing obligation to
"those offenses that a self-regulating profession must vigorously endeavor
to prevent," 174 the Model Rules recognize that the seriousness of the violation is a crucial determinant of the morality of informing. The more
serious the violation, the more likely it is that people will universally
agree that there is a moral duty to report it.
The Model Rules nevertheless fail adequately to focus and particularize the obligation to report. As discussed above, the more focused the
obligation, the more likely it is to reflect a moral consensus. The Model
Rules simply graft a perfectly sensible criterion for determining what sort
of violations should be reported-those violations that "raise[] a substantial question as to [a] lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
1 76
lawyer" 17 5-onto the Code's general obligation to report "knowledge"
of ethical violations. The Model Rules thus retain all of the ambiguities
present in the Code and add an additional layer of ambiguity by not specifically defining the "seriousness" criterion.
As experience with the few criminal or regulatory statutes that impose a duty to inform 177 has demonstrated, the more concrete the obligation imposed, the more likely it is to be effective. I submit that a more
productive rule for the legal profession would (1) define the reporting
obligation by listing violations determined by the bar to raise substantial
questions of fitness, and (2) require lawyers to report any information
that makes it reasonable to believe that such a violation has occurred.
These two changes, of course, are linked: an objective standard as to the
quality of the information to be reported will be effective only if (1) we
are confident that the violations specified are sufficiently serious and the
information is unlikely to be obtained from other sources, and (2) the
obligation thus imposed on lawyers is sufficiently clear that it can be
readily applied and enforced.
It is not the purpose of this article to specify the particular violations
to which a duty to report should attach. I would, however, tentatively
suggest three categories: professional misconduct involving dishonesty
toward a client or the legal process; serious criminal conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and incompetence clearly
amounting to malpractice.
1. ProfessionalMisconduct Involving Dishonesty Toward a Client or
Toward the Legal Process. There can be little doubt that fidelity to the
174. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 comment (1983).

175. Id. Rule 8.3(a).
176. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (1981).
177. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
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interests of a client ranks among the lawyer's most definite professional
obligations. Betraying a client's trust by fraud or by disclosure of confidences is a serious ethical breach. Such conduct certainly raises substantial questions of fitness.
Similarly, actions that obstruct judicial processes violate the very
essence of the lawyer's role in the administration of justice. A lawyer
who acts so as to compromise the fairness and integrity of legal processes
not only abuses his special position in society, but also undermines the
very system that defines that position. Because such misconduct strikes
at the core of the lawyer's duties, it also raises substantial questions of

fitness. 178
The criterion of special need for informer information is also met in
such cases. When a lawyer acts dishonestly or disloyally toward a client,
the client will not always be aware of the misconduct; lay people do not
always fully understand the scope of the obligations that lawyers owe
their clients. A lawyer who becomes aware of such misconduct is better
able to judge whether a violation has occurred and knows how to lodge
an appropriate complaint. Similarly, when a lawyer acts so as to distort
the truthfinding processes of the legal system, those most likely to be
aware of the misconduct and most able to assess its significance are the
other lawyers in the case; without complaints from lawyers, disciplinary
bodies would not be aware of the need to investigate. Because honesty
toward clients and the legal system is so important, 79 and because the
pertinent ethical rules are inherently difficult to enforce absent cooperation from other lawyers, moral reservations about informing can appropriately be subordinated in this context.
2. Serious Criminal Conduct Involving Dishonesty, Fraud,Deceit,
or Misrepresentation. When the misconduct in question occurs outside
the lawyer's professional role, the duty to report becomes much more
problematic. Without question, lawyers should scrupulously observe all

178. In discussing the lawyer's obligation to inform under the Model Rules, Professors Hazard
and Hodes cite three paradigmatic cases: destruction of evidence under subpoena, subornation of
pejury, and self-dealing with trust funds. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 4, at 556. Significantly, two of these examples deal with obstruction ofjustice, and the third with dishonesty toward a
client.
179. Delineation of the responsibilities of the lawyer to the client is the primary enterprise of
both the Code and the Model Rules. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons
4-7 (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.1-1.16 (1983). For their treatment
of the lawyer's responsibilities to the legal system, see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.2 (1983).
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criminal laws. All citizens bear this obligation, 180 and whether or not it
makes sense to say that lawyers have a "special obligation" to do so, their
legal training and the privileged social position they occupy both provide
special incentives.
It is less clear that lawyers who violate criminal statutes ought to be
subject, in every case, to professional discipline as well as criminal punishment. 18 1 Given the broad use of the criminal sanction for sumptuary
and regulatory purposes, 8 2 one may legitimately question whether the
act genuinely reflects on the ofwillful commission of any prohibited
183
law.
practice
to
fitness
fender's
But even assuming that it does, the moral and practical costs of imposing an obligation to inform in all such cases would be immense.
Whatever the appeal of the theoretical principle that any criminal violation is ipso facto professional misconduct warranting discipline, one must
acknowledge that ferreting out every instance of such conduct has never
been given a high priority by professional disciplinary bodies. A rule
that would generate complaints about minor criminal conduct would
have the effect of diverting limited disciplinary resources away from
more productive uses. After all, if the primary purpose of professional
discipline is to deter misconduct, 18 4 professional sanctions would be most
productively applied to misconduct that criminal sanctions do not adequately deter.
Furthermore, a reporting requirement applicable to all criminal conduct cannot be justified on the ground that lawyers are likely to be the
only available source of information. Nothing about the lawyer's professional role makes him more likely than any other witness to come upon
evidence of the criminal activities of other lawyers. 8 5 This is not, in
other words, a case analogous to physicians and gunshot wounds or undertakers and deaths. In those situations, society imposes reporting re180. This statement is meant to be noncontroversial; questions of the legitimacy of civil disobedience or any special problems raised by obsolete, unjust, or trivial laws, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIOHTS SERIOUSLY 206-22 (1977), are put to one side.
181. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
182. See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMrrS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 249-363 (1968) (arguing that criminal sanctions are applied in some cases where other responses may be more
appropriate).
183. For a general discussion of the relevance of various kinds of criminal and noncriminal acts
to bar admission and attorney discipline, see Rhode, supra note 18, at 529-46, 551-62.
184. See Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and ProfessionalRegulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 917, 999-1001.
185. Nothing, that is, except the attorney's role as advocate and counsel in criminal cases. But
information obtained in this professional setting would, of course, be privileged and not subject to
the reporting requirement in any event. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
1-103 (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(c) (1983).
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quirements because the actors are particularly good sources of the
information in question. There is no evidence that requiring lawyers to
report the criminal activity of other lawyers would substantially further
general law enforcement policies. To the extent that the bar wishes to
enforce the ethical obligation to obey criminal laws scrupulously, the
present general practice of leaving law enforcement to the police and following successful criminal prosecutions with disciplinary proceedings
seems adequate to make the point.
Although there is no special need for a reporting requirement applicable to all antisocial conduct on the part of lawyers, the balance shifts
when the conduct in question is both serious in nature and directly related to the lawyer's fitness to practice law. The moral ambiguity of informing begins to dissipate when truly serious criminal conduct is
involved. As the crime in question becomes more grave, the need to
recognize countervailing moral considerations decreases, and a lesser
showing of necessity for imposing the obligation is required.
In the particular context of professional discipline, however, the
question of which crimes should be regarded as serious takes on a special
twist. While the major crimes of violence obviously should be reported
in most situations as a matter of private morality, it is questionable
whether a special rule requiring lawyers to contact the grievance committee when they learn that another attorney has committed murder or rape
makes much sense. The social and institutional context weakens the
need for such a rule in three ways. First, there is nothing about being a
lawyer that gives rise to a special temptation to commit such crimes.
Second, there is no reason to expect that other lawyers will be particularly likely to come upon information concerning lawyer-committed
crimes, and alternative sources of such information are usually available
in any event. Third, professional disciplinary bodies are not the appropriate institutions to pursue cases of this kind. Thus, even if a lawyer,
like any other citizen, would be morally obligated to report evidence of a
violent crime to the authorities, it seems neither appropriate nor necessary to impose aprofessionalobligation to report such crimes simply because another lawyer has committed them.
In contrast, the bar ought to be particularly concerned about crimes
involving financial dishonesty. There is no reason to believe that lawyers
are part of a social class unlikely to commit crimes motivated by greed.
If anything, the opposite is true. Moreover, the nature of legal work
frequently places a lawyer in situations in which dishonesty could be
highly profitable. Crimes of fraud and misrepresentation, unlike crimes
of violence, are often business-related, and business associates of the
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wrongdoer will often be able to acquire information not readily available
to the victims or other witnesses.
Furthermore, bar discipline has a special role to play in this context.
First, because trustworthiness and fidelity are qualities essential to the
lawyer's professional role, the bar has a particular interest in policing
conduct that shows an absence of these qualities. Second, because law
enforcement agencies are not always willing or able to devote the resources necessary to prosecute many white-collar crimes, it is more difficult to assume that regular law enforcement authorities will adequately
handle the problem.
In light of these considerations, let us reexamine the hypothetical
cases involving Cool and Straight. Although narcotics distribution is a
serious offense the commission of which may well warrant the imposition
of professional sanctions, 18 6 the sale of cocaine is not sufficiently close to
the heart of the professional enterprise to justify overriding the moral
costs of a mandatory reporting requirement. The use of drugs by a lawyer, though a less serious criminal offense, may strike closer to the heart
of the professional enterprise: drug use could signify emotional instability
that could lead to diminished mental capacity which could in turn undermine a lawyer's professional performance. Heavy drug use can also leave
one in financial straits, and this in turn could increase the temptation to
commit a crime involving financial dishonesty. But surely such speculative consequences do not have such immediacy as to justify imposing a
duty to report on Straight, who has merely observed one episode of drug
use by Cool, and who has no reason to believe that Cool is mentally or
emotionally incapacitated or in financial straits as a result of his drug
use.
The hypothetical involving Pinstripe and Mouthpiece is not so readily resolved. Pinstripe has reason to believe that Mouthpiece has committed tax evasion, a crime involving financial dishonesty. In light of the
foregoing discussion, reporting would seem to be obligatory in this case.
As already indicated, most lay people typically do not report their
knowledge of such violations or believe that it would be right to do so.
Within the domain of legal discipline, however, a similarly lax attitude
toward tax evasion would be unwarranted. Crimes indicative of greed
and dishonesty should concern the legal profession. Moreover, lawyers
should not embrace the popular tendency to regard thefts from identifiable individuals as more serious than thefts from diffuse organizations.
As seriously as the bar ought to treat tax evasion for purposes of
professional discipline, however, the lack of a general consensus on the
186. See supra notes 24, 100.
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matter would suggest that no mandatory reporting duty should be imposed. It does not appear that tax evasion is generally thought to be as
intrinsically wrong as other forms of fraud. Although cases involving
extremely large amounts or other aggravating circumstances 87 may
cross the threshold of seriousness that gives rise to a reporting obligation,
Pinstripe has no way of knowing whether Mouthpiece has engaged in
monumental fraud or petty chiseling. Thus, Pinstripe is not in a position
to judge the seriousness of this particular offense. I would find it hard to
conclude that Pinstripe should be disciplined if she fails to report her
conversation with Mouthpiece to a grievance committee.
In short, even within the area of criminal conduct involving false
statements and financial dishonesty, mandatory informing seems questionable in at least some cases. Once more, the key is the seriousness of
the misconduct. The Model Rules are on the right track in imposing an
obligation to report only when the given misconduct "raises a substantial
question as to [the offending] lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness
as a lawyer in other respects." 188 But much clearer and more specific
notice of the cases in which reporting is required must be provided. With
regard to criminal activity conducted outside the professional context,
the reporting requirement should be limited, at a minimum, to extremely
serious misconduct involving dishonesty or breach of trust, with "extremely serious misconduct" operationally defined as conduct that would
clearly be expected to result in imprisonment and/or disbarment. Ideally, illustrative examples that are sufficiently comprehensive to provide
considerable certainty in the application of the rules should be provided
as well.
3. Any Failureof Competence or Zeal that Would Clearly Amount
to Malpractice. The need to ensure professional competence provides
the clearest justification for a mandatory informing requirement. Any
licensing and regulatory system must take the question of competent and
attentive performance seriously, whether its goal is to eliminate inadequate practitioners, provide incentives for adequate performance, or pro189
tect the public image of the regulated profession.
Because failures of professional competence are essentially offenses
against the client, much of what was said above with respect to disloyalty
187. The elaborateness of the deception involved and the source of the unreported income, for
example, would bear on the question. See, eg., United States v. Cunningham, 723 F.2d 217, 231 (2d
Cir. 1983) (elaborate tax evasion scheme and coverup relevant to the "substantiality" of the violation), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
188. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1983).
189. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 184, at 999-1001 (identifying principal goals of the disciplinary system).
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to clients 90 applies here as well. Offenses against clients satisfy the seriousness standard as well as the special need standard. Clients will rarely
be aware that their lawyer's professional services have fallen below professional standards. Moreover, there is nothing about malpractice cases
that provides other lawyers with an automatic incentive to report. Indeed, self-interest often will run against reporting.
The strongest argument against imposing an obligation in these circumstances is that it would be difficult to provide guidelines specifying
exactly what kind of incompetence should be reported. As commentators have often recognized, neither courts nor disciplinary bodies have
reached a consensus regarding what constitutes fundamental incompetence or lack of diligence.' 9 ' Moreover, even if courts and disciplinary
bodies could reach a consensus, imposing an obligation to report incompetence would entail certain risks. The obligation to report would likely
be so vague that many lawyers would simply refuse to take it seriously.
If this were to happen, enforcement would be most difficult.
Despite the difficulty of objectively assessing the quality of representation when issues of judgment or tactics are involved, 192 courts regularly
do adjudicate questions of attorney malpractice. At least some gross failings of zeal, care, or competence leave no reasonable doubt that the attorney has not met a basic standard of care. It is not clear that the
existing disciplinary system is the best means to regulate attorney competence.193 But as long as this system is used, some effort to judge competence will be required. A reporting obligation, if honored and enforced,
would have the salutary effect of protecting clients who may often be
unaware that they have been victimized by attorney malpractice.
The approach suggested here is designed to avoid the pitfalls found
in the present codes of conduct. Unlike the approach sketched out
above, which attempts to identify particular, reasonably concrete categories of conduct to which a reporting obligation would attach, Model Rule
8.3(a) imposes the reporting obligation in cases in which a rule violation
"raises a substantial question as to [the violator's] honesty, trustworthi190. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
191. See, eg., Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Professions:Is It Self-Regulation?,
1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 225-30. In the criminal area, the Supreme Court has apparently abandoned
any effort to establish specific standards of minimally adequate representation, setting out instead a
general standard of "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). For a review of the difficulties courts have encountered in applying
this standard, see Berger, The Supreme Court andDefense Counsel. Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead
End?, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 9 (1986).
192. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-91 (1984) (deferential judicial scrutiny of
counsel performance appropriate on matters of strategy or judgment).
193. See Marks & Cathcart, supra note 191, at 230-36.
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ness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects."
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The Model Rules are on

the right track. Yet by stating the reporting obligation in such general
terms, the Rules leave open considerable areas of uncertainty.
Restricting the reporting requirement to a few well-defined categories would permit the use of a more objective standard of knowledge.
This would eliminate a principal loophole in the current formulations.
Instead of requiring lawyers to report when they have "knowledge that
another lawyer has committed a violation," 1 95 a narrowly drawn reporting requirement could require a lawyer to inform whenever he has "reason to believe" that another lawyer has engaged in conduct of the sort
specified. Such a formulation would relieve the potential informer of the
burden of judging another lawyer's conduct in absolute terms and would
eliminate the potential for confusion or evasion that the Code's formulation presents. A formulation along the lines here suggested would
neither impose a crushing burden on those subject to it nor result in an
excessive number of unfounded reports. Moreover, if the rules limited
the reporting obligation to categories of serious misconduct, disciplinary
resources could be channeled more effectively and the resulting gains in
efficiency would probably offset any additional cost of investigating reports of conduct that proved to be innocent.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The legal profession's rhetorical commitment to an ethical obligation to report is anomalous. Like many pronouncements of a "correct"
standard of behavior, it is overinclusive and is so vague that calls for its
enforcement will remain unanswered. A standard that more fully recognizes the moral status of informing might appear to be less high-minded;
it would certainly apply to a much narrower range of cases. But the
cases to which it would apply would be those in which enforcement is
paramount and difficult to achieve by other means. Such a standard
would provide fewer excuses for noncompliance and would facilitate fair
enforcement. Accordingly, it would be far more useful to the enterprise
of professional discipline than noble-sounding but generally disregarded
exhortations.
If the true purpose of a lawyers' code of conduct is to present an
image of the legal profession as a noble brotherhood of high-minded aristocrats living by austere standards to which ordinary folk cannot conform, the conventional informing rules will serve nicely. But if the
194. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1983).
195. Id. (emphasis added). Cf.MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A)

(1983).
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purpose of the code is to set enforceable norms of conduct for a profession made up of fallible human beings with complex and differing moral
perceptions, a more limited and rigorous standard is required.
I do not believe, as some do, that lawyers' codes of conduct serve
only public relations and self-legitimation functions. Many lawyers do
care about doing the right thing and often look in vain to professional
codes for guidance. An effort to refine the codes would therefore be
worthwhile. Still, self-interest can distort the drafting of professional
codes, and moralistic standards that are compromised by day-to-day
pragmatism in enforcement can serve systemic purposes in such a way as
to thwart rational reform. I offer my suggestions in the hope that the
purposes of lawyers' codes can be served. It seems unlikely, though, that
the legal profession will soon abandon its rhetorical commitment to informing in favor of a more realistic position.

